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In recent months, the Afghan intelligence service has come under increased scrutiny and 
criticism for its use of torture and other violations of detainees’ rights.  This report raises 
significant, new areas of concern, including previously undocumented facilities where 
torture is taking place and the abuse of detainees transferred by international forces. The 
report is based on long-term, regular detainee monitoring conducted by the Afghanistan 
Independent Human Rights Commission (AIHRC), as legally mandated under the 
Constitution of Afghanistan, as well as on interviews with more than 100 conflict-related 
detainees between February 2011 and January 2012 (Dalwa 1389-Jadi 1390), conducted 
with the assistance of the Open Society Foundations. AIHRC monitors interviewed 
detainees in the National Directorate of Security (NDS) and Ministry of Interior (MOI) 
facilities while Open Society researchers interviewed detainees who had been previously 
held by the NDS and had either been transferred to MOI facilities or released. 
 
Researchers found credible evidence of torture at nine NDS facilities and several Afghan 
National Police (ANP) facilities, including beatings, suspension from the ceiling, electric 
shocks, threatened or actual sexual abuse, and other forms of mental and physical abuse, 
which were routinely used to obtain confessions or other information.
1
 Four of the NDS 
facilities where torture was documented were also identified by a recent United Nations 
report as practicing torture. Monitors also found evidence of torture at five additional 
NDS facilities. 
 
Several specific methods of torture that have been previously denied by the NDS, such as 
the use of electric shock, abuse of genitals, and threats of sexual abuse, were confirmed in 
interviews, providing even further evidence that these methods of torture have been used 
by NDS officials. Research also uncovered widespread and deliberate violations of 
detainees’ fundamental due process rights, including the right to counsel, and family 
notification, which contributed to increasing the risk of torture and other abuse.   
 
Researchers also examined the transfer of detainees from international forces to the 
Afghan government. In response to an October 2011 (Mizan 1390) UN report, 
International Security Assistance Forces (ISAF)  suspended all detainee transfers to 
                                                          
1
 Locations include NDS Kabul Department 90/124, NDS Herat, NDS Kandahar, NDS Laghman, NDS 
Badakhshan, NDS Helmand, NDS Kabul Department 17/40, NDS Nangarhar, and NDS Wardak, as well as 
ANP Kandahar headquarters and several ANP Kandahar checkpoints. 
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facilities of concern, initiated a regime to address problems identified at these facilities, 
and proposed an ambitious monitoring program to cover all detainees transferred by 
ISAF. Efforts by ISAF and troop contributing nations with national monitoring programs 
are welcome and can have a positive impact. But concerns raised in this report, including 
evidence of off-site abuse, and detainees’ fear of reprisals for disclosing abuse, suggest 
that a post-transfer monitoring system may not be sufficient to meet the obligations that 




The largest remaining gap in detainee monitoring is the lack of monitoring of U.S. forces 
outside the ISAF chain of command. Despite the high number of detainees transferred by 
U.S. forces, particularly by the Combined Forces Special Operations Component 
Command–Afghanistan (CFSOCC–A), which are not subject to the recently initiated 
ISAF monitoring program, the United States has yet to adopt a mechanism to monitor 




Researchers found credible evidence that some U.S.-transferred detainees have been 
subjected to torture by Afghan officials, underscoring the need for such a monitoring 
program. Ten cases were documented of individuals detained by U.S. forces between 
May 2010 (Saur 1389)and January 2012 (Jadi1390), and then transferred to NDS 
facilities where they alleged they were subsequently tortured. In four of these cases, 
individuals reported that they were held for some period of time at a detention facility 
located at or near Bagram Air Base, and in at least three cases individuals were 
transferred to NDS Kandahar after the suspension of transfers to the facility by all ISAF 
and U.S. forces. These cases raise serious concerns regarding U.S. policies on detainee 
transfers, particularly transfers by non-ISAF U.S. forces and U.S. special operations 
forces, and whether appropriate safeguards exist to protect detainees’ rights and ensure 
that the United States is not complicit in torture. 
 
The Afghan government has stated that it is committed to addressing concerns about the 
torture of detainees, and has largely responded positively to increased demands for access 
to facilities. The government has also recently established a human rights unit within the 
NDS to investigate allegations of abuse, all of which is strongly welcomed. However, 
research for this report indicates that the Afghan government has thus far largely failed to 
hold individuals responsible for detainee abuse accountable. In some cases, instead of 
dismissing and prosecuting responsible officials, the Afghan government has simply 
reassigned officials to other detention facilities. AIHRC monitors also continue to face 
challenges accessing some NDS facilities, including Department 90/124. 
 
                                                          
2
It should be noted that most of the cases of torture and abuse in NDS detention facilities documented by 
the AIHRC and the Open Society Foundations pre-date implementation of ISAF’s six-phase remediation 
plan and inspections regime. 
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 CFSOCC-A, along with all USFOR-A forces are subject to the transfer prohibitions and other aspects of 




While the Afghan government faces immense security and capacity challenges, this does 
not mean that torture is justifiable, or inevitable. The prohibition on torture is absolute 
under both Afghan and international law. The use of torture is a violation of fundamental 
human rights, and seriously damages the legitimacy of the Afghan government and its 
allies.  
 
The Afghan government has long made clear its demand for sovereignty over the 
detention of conflict-related detainees in Afghanistan. As the Afghan government 
assumes greater responsibility for security as well as detentions, and the drawdown of 
U.S. and other ISAF nations’ troops accelerates, the challenges associated with properly 
holding and prosecuting conflict-related detainees will only become more pressing for the 
government. Urgent action is required, and the Afghan government, with the support of 
its international partners, must take immediate, effective steps to address mistreatment 




Government of Afghanistan 
● Investigate and hold to account all those who are responsible for torture, including 
commanding officers. End the practice of moving rather than removing officials 
responsible for torture and make public or provide to AIHRC the results of 
investigations and actions taken. 
● Ensure AIHRC has full, unfettered, and confidential access to all NDS detainees and 
facilities, including NDS Kabul Department 90/124, as legally mandated under the 
Constitution of Afghanistan. Ensure NDS officials permit AIHRC monitors to 
conduct unannounced visits to all NDS facilities. 
● Provide the NDS Human Rights Unit with the authority and resources necessary to 
effectively investigate allegations of abuse and ensure those responsible are held to 
account. 
● Cease holding detainees incommunicado. Notify family members of detainee’s arrest 
immediately or as soon as practicably possible, ensure access to legal counsel, and 
permit family members to visit detainees. Transfer all detainees to MOI custody 
within 72 hours, inform detainees of the reason for their arrest within 24 hours, and 
ensure all detentions beyond 72 hours are authorized by a prosecutor or judge. 
● Ensure defense lawyers have access to detainees and all NDS detention facilities at all 
stages of detention as well as proper access to the findings of investigations and 
evidence against clients. 
 
ISAF and Troop Contributing Nations 
● Make use of ISAF suspension and remediation policies to work with the Afghan 
government to adopt measures that will protect all detainees from abuse, such as full, 
unfettered access by AIHRC, detainee access to defense counsel, and accountability 
for detainee abuse.  
● Ensure no detainee is transferred into facilities where there is real risk of torture. 
Where detainee transfers have been suspended by ISAF due to credible allegations 
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of torture, ensure resumption of transfers to a facility occur only when there is 
sufficient information to determine that there is no real risk of torture at that facility..  
 
United States 
● Support the NDS and the Afghan government to ensure all detainees are free from 
torture. Work with the NDS to identify critical deficiencies in resources, and provide 
appropriate technical and financial assistance to help ensure detainee treatment and 
interrogations comply with Afghan and international law. 
● Ensure all U.S. forces, including U.S. Special Operations Forces and intelligence 
agency personnel, comply with U.S. detainee transfer policies and international law 
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Every year throughout Afghanistan, thousands of individuals are detained by Afghan and 
international forces in connection with the armed conflict. As the conflict has intensified, 
the number of individuals detained on national security grounds has increased, with the 
vast majority ending up in the custody of the National Directorate of Security (NDS), 
Afghanistan’s intelligence agency. Accused of sensitive, national security-related crimes 
and often held in prolonged, incommunicado detention by intelligence officials, these 
conflict-related detainees are particularly vulnerable to torture and mistreatment. 
 
The Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission (AIHRC), has regularly 
monitored detainee treatment and detention conditions since 2002 , and along with 
other national and international human rights groups, has raised concerns about detainee 
abuse, as well as the potential complicity of international forces.  Following a United 
Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) report in October 2011 (Mizan 
1390), which exposed the depth and breadth of abuse, the Afghan government and its 




This report is based on interviews conducted by the AIHRC between February 2011 and 
January 2012 (Dalwa 1389-Jadi 1390), with assistance from the Open Society 
Foundations. The report raises significant, new areas of concern, including torture at 
facilities not previously identified, and continued transfers by U.S. and other international 
military forces that put detainees at risk of torture. The report assesses recent steps taken 
by the Afghan government to end abuse and hold perpetrators accountable, raising 
concerns that assurances have not been matched by action. It also examines whether 
international forces are doing enough to ensure that the detainees they transfer to the 
Afghan government are not at risk of torture.  
 
While comprehensive reform will take time, with sustained attention, the coming months 
represent a critical opportunity to maintain the momentum of reform and ensure 




National Directorate of Security (NDS) 
The NDS is Afghanistan’s principle intelligence organization, with primary responsibility 
for handling conflict-related detainees. The NDS also receives conflict-related detainees 
transferred from international military forces and other Afghan National Security Forces 
(ANSF). Though the NDS has primary responsibility for national security cases, other 
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 United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan, Treatment of Conflict-Related Detainees in Afghan 
Custody, October 2011, 
http://unama.unmissions.org/Portals/UNAMA/Documents/October10_%202011_UNAMA_Detention_Full
-Report_ENG.pdf [hereinafter “UNAMA, Conflict-Related Detainees in Afghan Custody”]. 
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Afghan security forces, like the Afghan National Police (ANP) and Afghan Local Police 
(ALP), also arrest and detain conflict-related detainees. While mistreatment is a problem 
for detainees throughout the Afghan justice system, research and experience have shown 
that conflict-related detainees are particularly vulnerable to abuse and torture. 
 
International Military Forces 
International Security Assistance Forces (ISAF) continue to regularly detain and transfer 
individuals to Afghan custody. Under ISAF’s “96-hour rule,” individuals detained during 
ISAF operations are generally released or transferred to Afghan authorities within 96 
hours. There is significant diversity in detention policies and practices among ISAF 
nations. The United States detains thousands of individuals all across Afghanistan, with 
the majority held in the Detention Facility in Parwan (DFIP) as well as a number of 
“temporary” detention sites, including a secretive U.S. screening facility at Bagram Air 
Base run by the U.S. Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC).
5
 Meanwhile, nations 
with a much smaller troop presence like Denmark may detain only a handful of 
individuals in a given year, and transfer all of those detained to the Afghan authorities. 
Some nations, like Germany, claim that they don’t take part in detentions themselves, yet 
nevertheless participate in military operations with Afghan forces in which individuals 




Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission (AIHRC)is a constitutionally-
established, independent national human rights institution which is mandated under 
Afghan law to monitor the situation of human rights in the country, promote and protect 
human rights, investigate and verify cases of human rights violations, and take measures 
for the improvement and promotion of human rights in Afghanistan. 
 
The Open Society Foundations is a nongovernmental organization that works throughout 
the world to build vibrant and tolerant democracies whose governments are accountable 
to their citizens. The Open Society’s Regional Policy Initiative on Afghanistan and 
Pakistan, which partnered with the AIHRC on this report, works with national civil 
society organizations in Afghanistan and Pakistan to conduct research, reporting, and 
advocacy on conflict-related human rights and policy issues.  
 
As part of its mandate, the AIHRC conducts regular monitoring of confinement 
conditions and detainee treatment in Afghan detention facilities. The AIHRC conducts 
                                                          
5
 Open Society Foundations, Confinement Conditions at a U.S. Screening Facility on Bagram Air Base, 
October 14, 2010 (22 Mizan 1389), 
http://www.soros.org/resources/articles_publications/publications/confinement-conditions-
20101014/confinement-conditions-20101014.pdf; [hereinafter “OSF, Confinement Conditions at a U.S. 
Screening Facility”]; Kimberly Dozier, “Terror Suspects Held for Weeks in Secret,” Associated Press, April 8, 
2011 (19 Hamal 1390), http://abcnews.go.com/International/wireStory?id=13325716 [hereinafter 
“Dozier, ‘Terror Suspects Held for Weeks’”]. 
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visits to detention facilities where it inspects conditions of confinement and conducts 
interviews with detainees as well as officials responsible for overseeing detention 
facilities.  
 
This report is based on interviews with detainees conducted by the AIHRC between 
February 2011 and January 2012 (Dalwa 1389-Jadi 1390). Interviews were conducted as 
part of AIHRC’s regular monitoring of NDS and MOI facilities by provincial monitoring 
and investigation teams. The AIHRC Special Investigations Team (SIT) also conducted 
interviews with detainees over this time period through 10 monitoring missions to NDS 
and MOI detention facilities. Together, AIHRC monitoring visits covered12 NDS and 11 
MOI detention facilities during the research period. During this period, the AIHRC has 
been denied access to detainees in NDS Kabul Department 90/124 and in NDS Kunar.  
 
In total, over 100 current or former NDS detainees were interviewed in the research 
period. 103 interviews were conducted by the AIHRC with detainees while in NDS 
custody or MOJ/MOI custody, and 15 interviews were conducted with recently released 
detainees by researchers.
6
 Interviews with detainees were conducted individually, 
confidentially, and in private, without the interference or presence of government 
officials in almost all cases. However, NDS officials prevented the AIHRC from 
conducting unannounced visits. AIHRC monitors were required to provide NDS officials 
with one or more days’ notice before monitoring visits were conducted. Informed consent 
was provided to use information provided by interviewees in this report. For security 
reasons and to protect interviewees’ identities, all the names of detainees featured in this 
report have been replaced with pseudonyms or numbers.  
 
Interviews were also conducted with 20 defense lawyers and legal aid organization 
directors, 15 detention facility officials, as well as other Afghan and foreign government 
officials. Most defense lawyers and government officials asked not to be named in this 
report. 
 
Researchers made efforts to verify the credibility of detainees’ statements, though given 
the limitations of access and the need to protect the identities of interviewees, this was 
often challenging. In some cases interviewers observed scars or other physical signs of 
abuse. In other cases, where possible, the interviewers sought to verify and corroborate 
information through interviews with witnesses, lawyers, government officials, and 
doctors. Interviews were also conducted with multiple detainees at each facility, so that a 
picture of consistent and credible allegations could be built. These findings are also 
consistent with the general picture of detainee abuse that has been documented by the 
AIHRC from 2002 to 2011, prior to this specific research period. Detainees interviewed 
at different times and in different locations also provided accounts of torture and abuse 
that were largely consistent with each other. In many cases, detainees described near 
identical methods of abuse, for example the use of suspension and tools like electric 
cables for beatings, as well as similarities in substance and patterns of questioning.  
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 On December 17, 2011 (26 Qaws 1390), President Karzai signed a decree that would transfer control of 




Evidence documented during interviews was also consistent with reports of torture 
received by UNAMA. Researchers verified that the detainees interviewed for this report 
were different than those interviewed by UNAMA—only four detainees interviewed for 
this report were also interviewed by UNAMA. Researchers found evidence of torture in 
many of the same locations as UNAMA, and methods of torture that were near identical 
to those documented by UNAMA, including suspension, beating, threats of sexual abuse, 
abuse of genitals, and electric shock.  
 
IV. Torture and Mistreatment of Conflict-Related Detainees in 
Afghanistan 
 
Between February 2011 and January 2012 (Dalwa 1389-Jadi 1390), researchers 
documented a significant number of cases of torture and other cruel, inhuman or 
degrading treatment of conflict-related detainees by NDS and ANP officials at 11 
different detention facilities in Afghanistan. Several specific patterns and methods were 
identified, including electric shock, threats of sexual abuse, and abuse of detainees’ 
genitals, as well as torture at undisclosed locations. 
 
In recent years, the Afghan government has taken a number of positive steps to address 
general weaknesses in the justice sector. The Afghan government has also adopted 
several measures to improve detainee treatment within NDS, particularly after reports of 
abuse. These measures have included training of NDS staff and the creation of two new 
monitoring bodies—a government committee to investigate and assess concerns raised by 
the recent UNAMA detentions report, and a human rights unit, which will have access to 




Though the Afghan government has made progress on reforms, and expressed a 
commitment to protecting detainees’ rights, this report’s findings indicate that torture 
continues to be a major problem in many facilities and requires further urgent action by 
the Afghan government and international partners to address the depth and breadth of 
detainee abuse. 
 
Methods of Torture 
Under international law, torture is defined as “any act by which severe pain or suffering, 
whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person for such purposes as 
obtaining from him or a third person information or a confession, punishing him for an 
act he or a third person has committed or is suspected of having committed, or 
intimidating or coercing him or a third person, or for any reason based on discrimination 
of any kind.”8 Torture occurs when such pain or suffering is inflicted by, at the 
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UNAMA, Conflict- Related Detainees in Afghan Custody, supra note 3. 
8
Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment 
(Convention against Torture or CAT), adopted December 10, 1984 (19 Qaws 1363), G.A. res. 39/46, annex, 




instigation of, or with the consent or acquiescence of a state official or other person 
acting in an official capacity.
9





The individuals interviewed for this report were detained or convicted on conflict-related 
charges.
11
 Based on interviews with 118 detainees, researchers found a significant 
number of cases in which NDS or ANP officials subjected detainees to treatment that 
constituted torture under international and Afghan law.  
 
Detainees were subjected to a variety of abusive interrogative methods by state actors or 
officials that inflicted severe physical or mental pain and suffering, constituting torture, 
including: 
 
 Beating (most often with kicks, punches, electric cables, wooden sticks, and 
plastic pipes, and rubber hoses ) 
 Suspension (being hung by the wrists or ankles from chains on the wall, fixtures, 
or the ceiling) 
 Electric shock 
 Threatened sexual abuse 
 Twisting and wrenching of the genitals 
 Forced prolonged standing 
 Burning (with cigarettes) 
 Biting (by interrogators) 
 
Beating was the most frequently reported form of abuse. Beatings were typically 
administered multiple times and over periods of several days, using a variety of tools 
                                                                                                                                                                             
Saratan 1366), art. 3, http://www2.ohchr.org/english/law/cat.htm, [hereinafter “CAT”]. Afghanistan 




Constitution of Afghanistan, ratified January 26, 2004 (6 Dalwa 1382),Art. 29, 
http://www.afghanembassy.com.pl/cms/uploads/images/Constitution/The%20Constitution.pdf.  
[hereinafter “Constitution of Afghanistan”]. According to Article 29 of the Constitution of Afghanistan, 
“No one shall be allowed to order torture, even for discovering the truth from another individual who is 
under investigation, arrest, detention or has been convicted to be punished”; see also Afghan Penal Code, 
Gazette No. 347 (October 7, 1976; 15 Mizan 1355), Art. 275, 
http://www.asianlii.org/af/legis/laws/clc1976ogn347p1976100613550715a429.txt/cgi-
bin/download.cgi/download/af/legis/laws/clc1976ogn347p1976100613550715a429.pdf [hereinafter 
“Afghan Penal Code”].Art. 275criminalizestorture and states that if public officials (including all NDS and 
ANP officials) torture an accused person for the purpose of obtaining a confession, they shall be 
sentenced to imprisonment between 5 and 15 years. 
11
 Conflict-related detainees are most often charged with offenses codified in the Penal Code(1976), the 
Law on Crimes against Internal and External Security of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan(1987), 
and the Law on Combat against Terrorist Offences(2008). The Law on Crimes against Internal and External 
Security lists the categories of the offenses NDS investigates, including but not limited to national treason, 
espionage, terrorism, sabotage, propaganda against the government, war propaganda, assisting enemy 
forces, and organized activity against internal and external security. SeeArt.1‐9, 23. 
14 
 
including electric cables, plastic pipes, and wooden sticks. Monitors also found that in 
many of the cases in which detainees were subjected to beating, they were also subjected 
to suspension by their arms or upside-down by their legs from walls, ceilings, or fixtures 
for durations lasting up to several hours, and in some cases repeatedly over periods of 




Several of these methods have been specifically and emphatically denied by the NDS, 
including electric shock, threatened sexual abuse, and abuse of genitals. This report’s 
findings contradict these denials by the NDS, and confirm that these methods of torture 




Monitors also found credible evidence of torture in NDS facilities in Herat, Kandahar, 
Laghman, and in NDS Kabul Department 90/124.Credible evidence of torture was found 
in NDS facilities in Kabul Department 17/40, Nangarhar, Badakhshan, Wardak, and 
Helmand; in ANP facilities in Kandahar, including the provincial ANP Headquarters; and 




Monitors received 14 credible allegations of NDS detainees being subjected to electric 
shocks, contradicting an official statement that the use of electric shock is “absolutely 
non-existent in the NDS.”14 
 
Detainees reported that electric shocks were often administered through wires clipped to 
their toes. As one detainee held in NDS Department 90/124 explained, “They used to tie 
my hands and sit me in a chair. They put two clips on my toes then used this machine 
with electricity [that was] giving electric shock to me. It was very hard. They were 
laughing, smoking cigarettes, making fun of us. We were screaming, screaming in 
pain.”15 Another detainee said, “They tied some wires to my two second toes. Then they 
gave me electric shocks. It was very bad treatment. So much pain…They kept asking me 
questions and saying ‘confess, confess!’”16 
 
Other detainees told monitors of the use of electric shocks on multiple areas of their 
bodies. According to one detainee, interrogators administered electric shocks “on my 
hands, temple, armpits, and testes. They would use around five minutes of electricity to 
get me to confess.”17 Another detainee said that his interrogators administered electric 
shocks three times, each time using “a kind of pistol like a gun for the shock. [It was] 
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Many of these methods are consistent with and corroborate UNAMA’s findings, including suspension, 
beating, electric shock, threatened sexual abuse, forced standing, and twisting and wrenching of the 
genitals. See UNAMA, Conflict-Related Detainees in Afghan Custody, supra note 3, p. 3. 
13
UNAMA, Conflict-Related Detainees in Afghan Custody, supra note 3, p. 61-62. 
14
UNAMA, Conflict- Related Detainees in Afghan Custody, supra note 3, p. 61-62.  
15
Interview with Detainee 99. 
16
Interview with Detainee 54. 
17
Interview with Detainee 46. 
15 
 
special electricity and would shock me all over the body…each time they used it, they 
placed it on different parts of my body.”18 
 
Detainees described intense pain from the shocks: “It felt like I was half-dead,” said one 
detainee. “My entire body was trembling and shaking, and my heart was beating very 
quickly, but I wasn’t able to move or speak.”19 Another detainee described electric shock 
as “the worst punishment; it destroyed your manhood, your dignity.”20 In some cases, the 
pain caused by the electric shocks would cause detainees to lose consciousness. “Every 
time I passed out from the pain,” said one detainee who was shocked 12 times in 
succession. “Every time I would go unconscious. Then I would wake up and they would 
shock me again.”21 
 
Threats of Sexual Abuse  
 
Monitors found 10 credible reports of NDS officials threatening to sexually abuse 
detainees. These findings contradict NDS claims that the practice is “absolutely non-





Interviewers were told that interrogators used the threat of rape to force detainees to 
confess. One detainee held in NDS Kandahar stated, “They said they would rape me, and 
one time they took a stick and dipped it into chili powder and threatened to insert the 
stick into my anus. They tried to pull off my pants. When they did that, I confessed to 
everything they wanted.”23 Other detainees experienced similar threats. One reported 
that, “They told me they will take off my shalwar [Afghan traditional dress] and rape me 
unless I confess.”24 Another detainee told interviewers that the interrogators “threatened 
to stick a plastic bottle up my anus. They asked me how many children I had, and when I 
said that I had five children, they said, ‘five is enough for you.’ They would tell me, ‘If 
you do not tell us the truth, you will get the bottle.’ They pulled my trousers down.”25 
 
 
Researchers found that the specific threats reportedly used by interrogators were 
consistent with the findings of UNAMA, including near identical forms of abuse 
threatened. All three groups received reports from different detainees that interrogators 
threatened to sexually abuse detainees with sticks coated in chili powder in NDS 
Kandahar and with plastic bottles in NDS Department 90/124.  
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Interview with Detainee 55. 
19
Interview with Detainee 101. 
20
Interview with Detainee 99. 
21
Interview with Detainee 54. 
22
UNAMA, Conflict Related Detainees in Afghan Custody, supra note 3, p. 61-62.  
23
Interview with Detainee 46. 
24
Interview with Detainee 51. 
25
Interview with Detainee 6. 
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Abuse of Detainees’ Genitals 
 
Monitors received reports from eight detainees that their genitals were physically abused 
by NDS officials. Three detainees in Kandahar, three detainees in NDS Department 
90/124, and one detainee in Herat reported that officials had twisted, wrenched, whipped, 
or otherwise abused their genitals in the course of their interrogations.
26
 These reports 
directly contradict NDS’s official statement that abuse such as the “twisting of sexual 
organs, etc.” is “absolutely non-existent in the NDS.”27 
 
One such detainee reported that over a period of seven days, “They whipped my testicles 
and my penis with a cable several times. There was blood in my urine after. I have no 
sexual feelings for women anymore. It hurts when I go to the bathroom.”28 
 
Detainees also reported that interrogators hung weights from their testicles. One detainee 
described how while in NDS Kandahar, “I was freed and taken to my cell to have some 
sleep. They gave me a blanket then. But that night, they tortured me. They tied my 
testicles with a rope and hung an iron weight from the rope. I can’t remember exactly 
how long this lasted, but it was for a long time. The torture made me confess 
everything…I confessed that I was involved with the Taliban.”29 Another detainee told 
the monitors that while in NDS Herat, “They took a weight and they tied it to my testicles 
so that it became very painful.”30 
 
Detainee Confessions Obtained Using Torture  
As noted above, international law defines torture as acts carried out by or with the 
consent or acquiescence of government officials where pain or suffering is inflicted for 
the purposes of “obtaining a confession,” “punishment,” or the “intimidation or coercion 
of an individual” or based on any “discriminatory” reasons.  According to interviewees 
for this report, in the vast majority of cases of abuse Afghan state officials inflicted pain 
for the purpose of obtaining a confession or coercing detainees to provide information. 
The evidence collected indicates that state officials often utilized specific methods of 
abuse in conjunction with interrogations, clearly aimed at coercing confessions or 
information from detainees, constituting torture under international law. This finding is 
consistent with a past AIHRC report.
31
 In its 2009 report, Causes of Torture in Law 
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Enforcement Institutions, the AIHRC stated that “one of the main causes of torture and 
other inhuman treatment is to obtain confessions and testimonies.”32 
 
Most detainees interviewed who confessed to crimes reported that they confessed only 
after being subjected to severe physical abuse. As one detainee described, “I was beaten 
with cables, and while I was being beaten, I confessed that I was associated with the 
Taliban…I was under such extreme pressure that I confessed. After it was finished I told 
them that I only confessed because of the beating.”33  Another detainee reported that he 
confessed only after interrogators beat him with electric cables, subjected him to electric 





Researchers also found that in most cases, interrogators would stop torturing the detainee 
after he confessed, indicating that the abuse was carried out for the purpose of obtaining a 
confession or information. As one detainee explained, “I couldn’t last longer than two 
days before I confessed. NDS just wants to send us to the central jail, and so they want 
my fingerprint [on the confession]. Once they have that, they will not torture anymore.”35 
The detainee was subjected to beatings with electric cables and physical abuse of his 
genitals before confessing.  
 
Another detainee described how he was tortured by officials until he confessed at NDS 
Department 90/124. “For five days and nights I was hung upside down for long periods 
of time. They beat me with PVC plastic pipes—they beat me on the back of my legs and 
everywhere else on my body. I couldn’t suffer the beatings and the torture any longer, 
and I didn’t want them to beat me anymore, so I put my fingerprint on the paper. I was in 
Department 90[/124] for 10 days, and after I gave them my fingerprint they stopped 
beating me and transferred me to Department 17[/40].”36 Detainees themselves identified 
a pattern in which abuse stopped once NDS officials obtained a confession: “I think that 
half of the prisoners are forced to confess like I was. When they arrest us, they torture at 
the beginning, but then they stop once they have a confession.”37 
 
Many detainees claimed that they were forced to provide false confessions.
38
 One 
detainee told monitors that he falsely confessed after 25 days of torture including 
                                                          
32
Likewise, in its October 2011 detentions report, UNAMA found compelling evidence that NDS officials at 
five facilities had used torture systematically “for the purpose of obtaining confessions and 
information.”See UNAMA, Conflict- Related Detainees in Afghan Custody, supra note 3, p. 3. 
33
Interview with Detainee 45. 
34
Interview with Detainee 7. 
35
Interview with Detainee 86. 
36
Interview with Detainee 12. Detainees are typically interrogated first in Department 90/124 before 
being transferred to Department 17/40. 
37
Interview with Detainee 80. 
38
 There is ample evidence that the use of torture in interrogations can lead to false confessions and 
unreliable information. See Juan E. Méndez ,Report of the UN Special Rapporteur on Torture and Other 
Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, United Nations UN Human Rights Council, 




suspension, severe beatings with pipes and cables on his feet, head, and genitals, and 
threats of sexual abuse. “They tortured me to confess…it was a forced confession. What I 
said was not true.”39 Another detainee interrogated at NDS Kandahar stated, “I was 
interrogated three times in NDS. Each time, I was beaten with hands, fists, and cables. 
One time I was beaten with the cables, and while I was being beaten, I confessed that I 
was associated with the Taliban. They said, ‘pull off your pants,’ and they threatened to 
penetrate me with a stick [in my anus]. I was under such extreme pressure that I 
confessed.” But the detainee insisted his confession was coerced and false. “After [the 
torture] was finished I told them that I only confessed because of the beating. But they 
responded to that by beating me again,” he said. “I swear by God and by my children that 
I am innocent.”40 
 
Failure to Exclude Forced Confessions in Court 
Under Afghan law, confessions extracted under torture are not admissible in court.
41
 
However, interviews with detainees and defense lawyers (and based on the AIHRC’s 
long standing experience monitoring Afghan courts), suggest that Afghan judges often 
accept the confessions of detainees even if detainees have told the court that their 
confessions were forced through the use of torture.  
 
During the research period for this report, several interviewees alleged that they were 
convicted of crimes based on forced confessions.
42
According to one detainee, he was 
convicted and imprisoned based on a confession provided after a month and a half of 
torture by NDS officials. “They would come in and beat me two or three times a day and 
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usually once a night. Every time they would beat me, they would also ask me questions. 
They put me down and tied my feet, and then they whipped my feet with the cables. The 
color of my feet was changed to the black of your shirt. One time…they took my trousers 
down. So of course after this I signed the confession, and I put my name on it and I 
stamped it,” he said. The court accepted the detainee’s confession and sentenced him to 
16 years in prison.
43
 A defense lawyer from Kandahar complained, “We are not happy 
with the courts. The confession comes from pressure through torture, beatings, etc, and 
we tell the court that the confession came through such illegal means, and according to 
the Constitution this is not right. But the judges do not listen to us.”44 
 
Locations  
The researchers found credible evidence of torture at nine separate NDS facilities:
45
 
 NDS Kabul Department 90/124   
 NDS Herat 
 NDS Kandahar 
 NDS Laghman 
 NDS Badakhshan 
 NDS LashkarGah 
 NDS Kabul Department 17/40 
 NDS Nangarhar 
 NDS Wardak 
 
NDS Kabul Department 90/124  
 
Interviews with detainees indicate that torture is a particularly serious problem in NDS 
Counter-Terrorism Department 90/124 in Kabul.  
 
In NDS Department 90/124, “high-value” terror suspects are detained, including those 
suspected of holding positions of authority in anti-government elements or being 
involved in high-profile attacks. Although the AIHRC repeatedly requested permission to 
interview detainees held in NDS Department 90/124, the NDS has refused to grant 
access.
46
 However, monitors interviewed detainees who had been released or transferred 
from NDS Department 90/124 to other facilities. Out of the 12 detainees interviewed who 
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had been detained in NDS Department 90/124, 11 reported being subjected to abusive 




Detainees in NDS Department 90/124 reported that they were subjected to a number of 
different forms of torture. A significant number of detainees reported being suspended 
and beaten, as well as threatened with sexual abuse. Other forms of abuse were also 
reported, including burning with cigarettes, and stretching detainees while lying on a 
wooden board. 
 
Many detainees reported being subjected to repeated, severe beatings during 
interrogations in NDS Department 90/124. “During the questionings, I would be hit on 
the head and body with shoes and books, and they would pull my beard and bang my 
head against the wall. These beatings happened at least 10 times during my month of 
interrogation,” said one detainee.48 Another detainee reported, “They would put me on 
my hands and knees and then hit me on the back with electric cables and one long, heavy 
pipe. I was only beaten during interrogation times—they wanted me to confess to being a 
Talib or a suicide bomber. These beatings would happen at least once a day and 
sometimes more. Once I was beaten four times in one night. I was in such bad shape that 
I couldn’t even walk to the bathroom. I had to crawl…Before I came here [to prison], I 
had a black beard. Now my beard is half white.”49 
 
According to detainees held in NDS Department 90/124, such beatings were a common 
practice in the facility. As one detainee explained, “Many people were being beaten. We 
were all brought down to the basement. The basement was the torture place. It was like a 
butcher shop—you could see blood everywhere…You could hear a lot of screaming. 
Screaming like it was animals screaming. When we would scream, the guards would put 
their fists under our chins to stop our voices.”50 
 
Detainees also reported being suspended from the wall or ceiling for several days at a 
time. One detainee described how he was suspended from the ceiling with his arms 
shackled and his feet “barely touching the ground” for 11 days: “I was only released from 
the restraints to eat, pray, go to the bathroom, and to be beaten. I begged the interrogators 
for rest.”51 Another detainee was suspended for seven days. “They kept me blindfolded, 
and they hung me from the wall so that my feet were not touching the ground,” he said. 
“They would take me down for meal times, and usually they would take me down for 
prayer time…I was out of my senses during this time—my feet were very swollen from 
the hanging. I didn’t know that it was my feet, they were so swollen and strange 
looking.”52 
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Other detainees who had been detained in NDS Department 90/124 reported being beaten 
while they were suspended. One detainee reported that he was “hung upside down for a 
long period of time” and received multiple beatings while in this position. The detainee 




Several additional forms of torture were also reported by detainees held in NDS 
Department 90/124. For instance, one detainee described how he was placed on a “long, 
wooden board and pulled in both directions.”54 Another detainee reported that 






Researchers also found evidence of torture in NDS Herat, although a monitoring visit on 
February 13, 2012 (24 Dalwa 1390), found evidence of improvements in detainee 
treatment. Seven individuals who had been detained at the Herat facility reported that 





Though most cases occurred prior to the implementation of ISAF inspections in response 
to the UNAMA report, one case of abuse occurred after the ISAF inspection of NDS 
Herat. A 15 year-old detainee reported that he was arrested by ALP and then transferred 
to NDS Herat on or around November 5, 2011 (14 Aqrab 1390). The detainee reported 
being beaten by NDS officials at NDS Herat for multiple days from November 9, 2011 
(18 Aqrab 1390),onwards. “I was beaten with a double twisted electric cable. They hit me 
on my head until I couldn’t feel anything and tears were coming from my eyes.”57 The 
detainee stated that he was regularly beaten in a container located within the NDS 
facility. He also described being forced to lie down on his chest and being beaten on his 
back and backside for one to one and a half hours in a room within or adjacent to the 
same container. While abusing the detainee, NDS officials demanded that he name 
members of the Taliban at his school. The detainee stated that his confession was 
obtained by force after he “was too dazed from the beatings with the cable to know what 
[he] was saying.”58 
 
Evidence of Torture in Additional NDS Facilities
59
 
Two interviewees who were detained in NDS Wardak reported being subjected to torture, 
including suspension and beatings. One detainee stated, “They hung me and used many 
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Aside from NDS Kandahar, the six NDS facilities listed below are additional to those where UNAMA 
found evidence of systematic torture.    
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different forms of torture. It was very severe; they used electric cables, wooden sticks, 
metal rods, and hung us upside down. They asked questions [saying] tell us the links you 
have [and that] you are Talib…accept and confess these things. They kicked and slapped 
me…it was very, very bad treatment.”60 Another detainee reported similar practices of 
beating and suspension, as well as forced standing. “They stood me in front of a wall, tied 
one leg to the wall and forced me to stand on the other leg. If I couldn’t stay up and 
balance they would beat me…They beat me a lot. They used a rubber hose, rope, and 
plastic around my feet. They took the binding on my feet and had a pulley attached to the 
ceiling and hung me upside down,” he said. The detainee reported that while he was 
upside down, the interrogators would “bounce me up and down and slam my head into 
the ground.”61 
 
Researchers also found evidence of torture and mistreatment, including beatings, 
suspension, and biting, in seven cases in Department 17/40 in NDS Kabul, the most 
recent allegation dating to August 2011 (Asad 1390). One detainee reported beatings, 
suspensions, and beatings while suspended.
62
 Another detainee reported that he was 
subjected to severe beatings of his lower body during his detention in Department 17/40. 
He also reported being bitten by interrogators; two bite marks were visible to 




Eight detainees in NDS Nangarhar provided credible allegations of torture, including one 
detainee who recounted how he was repeatedly beaten with a stick over the course of 11 
days. After one beating, the detainee reported, he was made to stay outside in the rain, 
naked, for around 30 minutes. These beatings were so severe, he said, that “it was painful 
just to have the material of my prison uniform resting on my skin.”64 One detainee also 
reported being beaten with sticks, and another with sticks and electrical wires.
65
Another 
detainee who had been detained in NDS Nangarhar reported that he was subjected to 
various forms of torture over a period of 20 days including suspension, electric shocks, 




In NDS LashkarGah, monitors documented two credible allegations of torture, both 
including severe beatings. One detainee alleged that abuse occurred in January 2011 (Jadi 
1389), while the other alleged that abuse occurred in October 2011 (Mezan 1390). An 
additional detainee reported being abused by NDS officials in an NDS facility in Nad Ali 
district. However, the large majority of detainees interviewed that were held at NDS 
LashkarGah reported no mistreatment. One detainee stated that while in custody in NDS 
LashkarGah, “They [the interrogators] hit me on the back and feet with a solid iron 
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pipe…They also beat us with their fists. They gave us such beatings. They would not 
give up…they would beat you until you said that you have relations with the Taliban.”67 
The same detainee mentioned that detainees who had been tortured were moved to an 
isolated room when the facility was visited by outside monitors. “When the authorities 
came to the NDS, they would keep us—the ones who had been tortured—somewhere else 
so that we would not be seen. There was an underground room.”68 
 
Five victims of mistreatment and torture were also interviewed in NDS Badakhshan. One 
detainee was reportedly tied between two trees and beaten until he lost consciousness. 
After three days of detention and interrogation by the NDS, he was eventually released. 
Another detainee was abused at NDS Keshim District (in Badakhshan Province) through 
kicking, punching, and beatings from officials with the butts of their guns. He was then 
transferred to NDS Badakhshan, where the head of interrogation beat him with a stick. 
The head of NDS Keshim District and the head of interrogation of NDS Badakhshan both 
acknowledged to the AIHRC that they had abused the detainee, and monitors obtained 
photographic evidence of marks, bruises, and cuts on the detainee’s back, legs, and 
shoulders from the beatings.
69
 Four allegations of abuse in NDS Laghman were reported 
during the research period; the most recent abuse was alleged to have taken place in July 
2011(Saratan 1390). 
 
AIHRC monitors also received a significant number of credible allegations of abuse in 
NDS Kandahar—a total of 20 over the course of the research period. AIHRC monitors 
most recently visited NDS Kandahar in January 2012(Jadi 1390), and documented 10 
credible allegations of abuse. 
 
Torture and Mistreatment at Non-NDS Facilities Holding Conflict-Related Detainees 
 
Juvenile Corrections Center Helmand 
 
Monitors also found credible evidence of mistreatment at the Juvenile Corrections Center 
(JCC) in Helmand. It is unclear, however, whether those who reported abuse were 
themselves conflict-related detainees as NDS LashkarGah regularly transfers juvenile 
conflict-related detainees to the facility.  
 
Reports of abuse at the JCC Helmand included sexual abuse and routine beatings. One 
detainee reported that there were three juveniles who were regularly raped by the director 
and the director’s son: “They have been used many, many times. Whenever they want to 
use them they do…It will happen outside the center [pointing to the area behind the 
building where the detainees are held]. Even in this office they can do it.”70 
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One detainee reported that he had been subjected to multiple beatings with fists and an 
iron pole: “One time the director made us stand up. After we stood for a long time he 
yelled, ‘Why are you standing,’ and he hit me…[W]e get hit very hard with the pipe. I 
have a scar on my back from one beating,” he said. A one-inch scar was visible to 
interviewers on the upper-right side of his back. He continued, “If you look at the 
buttocks of the other boy prisoners, you will see that they have been hit with the pipe. 
You will see their scars.”71 
 
AIHRC officials followed up on the report of sexual abuse, interviewing every detainee 
at the JCC in Helmand. Their investigation found that the allegations of abuse, including 
sexual abuse, were credible. AIHRC monitors also received reports that juvenile 
detainees had been threatened not to speak about mistreatment to AIHRC monitors, and 
that detainees had in the past been beaten for disclosing abuse to AIHRC monitors. 
 
As a result of the AIHRC’s findings, the governor of Helmand removed the director of 
the JCC Helmand on or around July 21, 2011 (30 Saratan 1390). The director was 
removed from JCC Helmand within days of the AIHRC’s investigation—swift action that 
is welcome and speaks to the credibility and seriousness of the AIHRC’s findings. 
However, it remains unclear whether the individual was criminally prosecuted for alleged 
crimes.  
 
Afghan National Police Facilities in Kandahar  
 
Researchers interviewed multiple individuals detained by the Afghan National Police 
(ANP) in Kandahar who reported being mistreated and tortured while in ANP custody.  
 
Detainees were reportedly tortured at a variety of official and unofficial locations 
including ANP check posts, ANP headquarters, and other ANP facilities in Kandahar. 
Multiple methods of torture were used and were broadly similar to those reportedly 
employed by some NDS officials, including beatings with kicks, fists, electric and wire 
cables; choking; electric shock; and squeezing of testicles.
72
 One detainee also reported 
that he was interrogated and tortured at an unofficial detention facility (see below). 
 
Several detainees reported being tortured while detained at ANP Headquarters. One 
detainee reported that interrogators “would hold me from the neck until I became 
unconscious, and then they would kick me very hard. I had to pass urine in the cell, so I 
was forced to sleep in my own urine. The police [ANP] told me that I should never tell 
anything that happened there to anyone. They treated us like animals.”73 
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Detainees also reported being tortured while in custody at ANP check posts. After being 
arrested, detainees reported being held at ANP check posts for substantial periods of 
time, between one and four days, and were not immediately transferred to the provincial 
headquarters of the ANP or the NDS. It was during this time that detainees were 
interrogated and subjected to mistreatment and torture. One detainee reported being 
subjected to beatings, stress positions, and abuse of his genitals while detained at the 9
th
 
district police check post. He told researchers that ANP officials “made me lie down on 
the ground on my stomach and one of the officials sat on my back and started pulling my 
hand and legs to join them together. [As a result] he broke my left arm. After this they 
started squeezing my testicles so that I couldn’t bear it. They did it so many times that 
blood came out of one side of my testicles.”74 The detainee stated that ANP officials were 
torturing him in order to obtain a confession. “Repeatedly they were showing me some 
AK47s, a rocket launcher, and other explosive materials and saying that I should confess 
that they were mine, but I hadn’t ever seen them before and they were not mine.”75 
 
Researchers for this report have also received allegations that one detainee died in April 
2011 (Hamal 1390)as a result of torture and mistreatment at an ANP check post. The 
AIHRC investigated this case at the time of the incident and the findings have also been 
previously reported by UNAMA.
76
 According to interviews with family members, the 
individual was detained at an ANP check post for several days, where he was kicked and 
beaten with fists and wire cables. He was then transferred to NDS Kandahar. Around 15 





A doctor at Mirwais Hospital, the province’s main hospital, stated that they have treated a 
significant number of individuals for injuries sustained while in ANP custody. “Most 
injury cases we receive are from the police. Sticks, guns, cables, they use all these kinds 
of things to beat detainees. There is no controlling them—they can do anything and 
everything to people.”78 The doctor described a recent case of a 60-year-old man who had 
been severely beaten in ANP custody. According the doctor, the beatings suffered by the 
man had caused blood vessels in his leg to rupture, leaving his leg without sufficient 
blood supply. “He was here in the hospital for two nights, and we said we needed to 
amputate or he would die, but he decided to leave. [He] maybe went to Pakistan, 
probably Quetta or Peshawar, to get treatment.”79 
 
Another detainee reported being subjected to severe beatings and electric shock at a 
location that was not an official ANP detention facility. He stated that he was transferred 
from ANP headquarters to a provincial government building that was not an official 
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detention facility, where he was detained and interrogated for two days. “They used an 
electric cable to beat me—30 times, 30 lashes with the cable. They beat me on both sides 
of my feet, usually on the soles of my feet. Then they beat me with the cables on my 
head, 27 times they beat me. [I] still [have] marks from this. [I was] bleeding from my 
hands, feet, and head very badly. Four other people I spoke to [at NDS Kandahar] were 
also beaten [there].” The detainee was also subjected to electric shocks. “It was so much 
pain; they said confess, confess, they kept asking me questions. Twelve times they 
shocked me. Every time I passed out from the pain, and they kept asking me questions 
and saying confess, confess. They took my thumbprint [upon confession].”80 The 
detainee said he believes the Afghan Border Police (ABP) were responsible for detaining 
and abusing him at this location before transferring him to NDS Kandahar. 
 
The ANP is playing a prominent role in counter-terrorism and national security cases in 
Kandahar, including working closely with U.S. and ISAF forces in major operations 
during 2010 and 2011(1389-1390).
81
 Consequently, the ANP appears to be involved in 
detaining and interrogating a significant number of conflict-related detainees in 
Kandahar. Researchers found evidence that ANP officials in Kandahar not only engage in 
torture of detainees but have done so at as many as five sites, one reportedly not an 
official ANP facility, in some cases for multiple days at a time.  
 
Challenges to Effective Detainee Monitoring 
In the course of conducting interviews for this report, researchers found that effective 
monitoring of NDS and other detention facilities was hindered by several factors, 
including holding or moving detainees to concealed or secret locations where AIHRC 
monitors have not been granted access, and detainees’ fears of reprisals for reporting 
torture and mistreatment. The impact of fear of reprisals acting as an impediment to 
effective detainee interviews, particularly while the detainees remain in custody, has 
impeded monitoring in Afghanistan and has been cited as a major obstacle by human 
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Evidence of  Efforts to Conceal Torture 
 
Reports from several detainees indicate that NDS officials may have conducted 
interrogations and engaged in torture in locations within or close to detention facilities 
that may not be readily visible or made accessible to outside monitors, such as basements 
and temporary containers. The reported use of such locations raises concerns that some 
officials are seeking to evade independent monitoring and conceal detainee abuse. 
 
 
Monitors received reports of a basement facility in NDS Herat. Five detainees 
interviewed stated that they were brought to a basement or underground room in NDS 
Herat for interrogation.
83
 One detainee stated that the underground room was in “the old 
NDS facility,” which lies behind the main white office building inside the NDS Herat 
compound. All five detainees who were taken to the basement were tortured there. 
Detainees reported that NDS officials used a variety of methods of torture, including 
suspension by the arms from steel bars and beatings. In one case, a detainee claimed that 
after being beaten he was immersed in a tub filled with salt water in order to increase the 
pain from his wounds.
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 The existence of an underground room within the former NDS 
Herat building was corroborated by another interviewee who stated that he was held in an 




Monitors also received several reports of NDS officials acting to conceal evidence of 
torture or mistreatment from monitoring organizations. One detainee from Kandahar told 
the AIHRC that one of his fellow detainees at NDS Kandahar, who had been “beaten 
hard,” was transferred “to some unknown place” the day before the AIHRC visited the 
facility; NDS Kandahar does not permit unannounced visits by AIHRC monitors and 
requires at least one day notice.
86
 Similarly, a detainee in Helmand reported that “when 
the authorities came to the NDS, they would keep those of us who had been tortured 
somewhere else so that we would not be seen. There was an underground room, and there 
were three of us who were kept there.”87 
 
Detainees’ Fears of Reprisal for Revealing Evidence of Torture or Mistreatment 
 
Several detainees reported that they feared being subjected to reprisals for discussing 
mistreatment with monitors. One detainee in NDS Herat, who had reported being 
subjected to severe beatings and abuse of his genitals, stated at the end of the interview, 
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Interview with Detainees 87, 94, 95, 96, and 97. In addition, Detainee 93 said that he has relatives who 
were abused in a basement facility of NDS Herat, and Detainee 89 said that he knows other prisoners at 
the Herat central prison who were tortured in such a basement. Neither Detainee 89 nor Detainee 93 was 
taken to the basement himself, however. 
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Interview with Detainee 96. 
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 Interview with anonymous, December 4, 2011 (13 Qaws 1390). 
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Interview with Detainee 59. 
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Interview with Detainee 80. 
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“I have nothing else to say. They will put me somewhere else after I talk to you. They 
will disappear me.”88 A detainee at the Juvenile Corrections Center in Helmand reported 
to the AIHRC that he and his fellow detainees were severely beaten as a consequence of 
having reported mistreatment at the facility. “We wrote a complaint letter once, but the 
director found out, and then we got hit very hard with the pipe after that,” he said.89 
 
Some detainees’ fears of reprisal had a direct impact on what they would disclose to 
monitors. In one case, an official in NDS Parwan repeatedly interrupted an interview 
conducted by two AIHRC monitors. When the detainee being interviewed began to talk 
about the conditions and treatment in NDS Parwan, the official repeatedly yelled at the 
detainee that he should “tell the truth!”90 Another detainee interviewed by an AIHRC 
monitor in NDS Laghman indicated that he had been severely beaten by speaking quietly 
and making hand gestures, refusing to say any more because “[the official] will come 
back and I will be in trouble.”91 
 
V. International Detainee Transfers, Monitoring, and Joint Operations 
 
Under the general international law principle of non-refoulement, which has a basis in 
international human rights, refugee, and humanitarian law, states are prohibited from 
transferring persons under their effective control to the custody of another state if there 
are substantial grounds to believe the individual would face a real risk of torture or cruel, 
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.
92
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[hereinafter “Gillar, ‘There’s No Place Like Home’”]. See also Center for Human Rights and Global Justice, 
New York University Law School, Minimum Standards for Transfer: International Law Concerning 
Rendition in the Context of Counter-Terrorism, June 2009 (Jawza 1388), 
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ISAF forces continue to regularly detain and transfer individuals to Afghan custody. 
Under ISAF’s “96-hour rule,” individuals detained during ISAF operations are generally 
released or transferred to Afghan authorities within 96 hours. However, in the absence of 
more detailed, uniform standards and guidelines for detention transfers, in large part due 
to the multinational structure of ISAF, in which each nation may interpret legal 
obligations differently, there is significant diversity in detention policies and practices 
among ISAF nations.  
 
ISAF nations also face very different circumstances and challenges when it comes to 
detentions. The United States detains thousands of individuals all across Afghanistan, 
with a majority held in the Detention Facility in Parwan (DFIP, formerly known as the 
Bagram Theater Internment Facility). Meanwhile, nations with much smaller troop 
presences, such as Denmark, may detain only a handful of individuals in a given year, 
with operations, detentions, and transfers confined to a single province. Other nations, 
such as Germany, claim that they don’t take part in detentions themselves, yet 
nevertheless participate in military operations with Afghan forces in which individuals 
are arrested and detained.  
 
It is important to note that some U.S. forces in Afghanistan operate as a part of Operation 
Enduring Freedom (OEF), a U.S. led counter-terrorism coalition that is separate from 
ISAF forces.
93
 Known as U.S. Forces Afghanistan (USFOR-A), most of these non-ISAF 
U.S. forces are special operations forces and also referred to as Combined Forces Special 
Operations Component Command-Afghanistan (CFSOCC-A). CFSOCC-A forces 
frequently conduct operations in which individuals are detained. USFOR-A is under the 
command of General John Allen, who also serves as the commander of ISAF (COM-
ISAF). There are also a number of U.S. military units that operate separately from ISAF 
and USFOR-A forces, and are not under the command of General Allen.  
 
U.S. detention operations are run by the Combined Joint Interagency Task Force-
435 (CJIATF-435). Officially, the United States runs one long-term detention facility, the 
Detention Facility in Parwan (DFIP), though previous work by the Open Society 
Foundations shows that a number of “temporary” detention sites are also maintained, 
including the secretive “Tor Jail” (“Black Jail”) at Bagram Air Base, run by the U.S. Joint 
Special Operations Command (JSOC).
94
 USFOR-A forces do not consider themselves to 
be bound by ISAF’s 96-hour rule, and it is believed that they are permitted to hold and 
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interrogate detainees at these temporary detention sites for up to nine weeks before 




At least six ISAF troop contributing nations (TCNs) have negotiated separate 
Memorandums of Understanding (MoUs) with the Afghan government, which govern 
detention authority and transfers: the United Kingdom, Canada, Australia, Denmark, 
Norway, and the Netherlands.
96
 These MoUs involve varying levels of monitoring of 
transferred detainees as part of the agreements. However, monitoring programs have 
varied in quality and suffered from some serious weaknesses, and have been shown in 
some cases to be insufficient to safeguard against abuse and torture of detainees 
transferred to Afghan custody.
97
 For years, credible allegations of mistreatment and 
torture of detainees in Afghan custody have surfaced despite the existence of MoUs, 








 Amnesty International, Afghanistan: Detainees Transferred to Torture: ISAF Complicity?, November 
2007 (Aqrab 1386), http://www.amnesty.ca/amnestynews/upload/ASA110112007.pdf [hereinafter 
“Amnesty International, Afghanistan: Detainees Transferred to Torture”]. See also, Stephen Smith, 
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Defence, December 14, 2010 (23 Qaws 1389), 
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As discussed below, while monitoring by international forces of the detainees that they 
transfer is a welcome step, such measures alone do not necessarily meet the legal 
obligations of states to ensure that detainees transferred to Afghan custody do not face a 






ISAF Six-Phase Response Plan 
In response to the findings in the UNAMA detentions report, ISAF has begun 
implementing a six-phase plan to address torture and ill-treatment. The plan includes the 
suspension of detainee transfers to 16 facilities identified by UNAMA as practicing 
torture, combined with measures to allow for the resumption of transfers. It should be 
emphasized that the findings in this report on torture and abuse in NDS detention 
facilities in most cases pre-date implementation of ISAF’s six-phase remediation plan 
and inspections regime. One allegation of torture in NDS Herat and 14 allegations in 
NDS Kandahar were received after the implementation of ISAF’s response plan.  
Consequently, aside from these cases, this report’s findings should not be used as a basis 
for judging the effectiveness of ISAF’s response plan. More information is needed in 
coming months to properly assess whether ISAF’s inspections, certifications, and other 




However, as discussed in section IV, research conducted for this report points to serious 
flaws in the ISAF plan, including abuse outside the 16 facilities identified by UNAMA, 
and reports of undisclosed locations of detention and interrogation. While the 
comprehensive monitoring scheme will greatly increase ISAF’s awareness of abuses in 
other facilities, there is clearly a need for more proactive efforts to accurately assess the 
risk of torture faced by potential transfers. Furthermore, there are U.S. forces and 
personnel that remain unbound by ISAF remedial actions and proposed monitoring (see 
section VI below).  
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ISAF’s six-phase plan includes a process of certification for the facilities where torture 
has been discovered. This involves inspections of implicated facilities, when detainees 
and staff are interviewed, followed by remedial training of all detention facility staff. An 
additional inspection is conducted to verify completion of training and review any 
evidence or allegations of abuse through interviews with detention facility staff and 
detainees. If there are any credible allegations of abuse, certification of the facility cannot 
proceed, and the inspections and certifications process is restarted.  
 
After inspections, trainings, and follow up visits are completed, recommendations are 
made by relevant ISAF officials and field commanders to COM-ISAF, who makes a final 
determination as to whether to certify a facility for resumption of transfers. As of 
February 15, 2012 (26 Dalwa 1390),ISAF has certified 13 of 16 facilities, including NDS 
Herat, NDS Uruzgan, NDS Khost, NDS Takhar, NDS Kapisa, ANP Zhari, AUP Kunduz, 
AUP Dasht-e-Archi (a district of Kunduz province), and AUP Khost. Four of these 
certifications are "conditional," which means ISAF determined there was insufficient 
information to fully certify the facility for resumption of transfers. Given the smaller size 
of some facilities and the turnover in detainees, ISAF assessment teams found no 
detainees to interview at some facilities, and were consequently unable to gather the 
information necessary to fully certify those facilities for resumption of transfer. These 
conditionally certified facilities include ANP Arghandab (Kandahar province), ANP 
Daman (Kandahar province), ANP Kandahar City District 9, and NDS Laghman. This 
conditional status permits transfer of detainees subject to an immediate (within 72 hours) 
unannounced site visit to interview detainees regarding their treatment and confinement 
conditions. Three facilities remain prohibited for detainee transfers: NDS Kabul 
Department 90/124, NDS Kandahar, and ANP Kandahar City District 2.  
 
Currently, when an individual is captured in a joint ISAF/ANSF operation, ISAF forces 
accompany the detainee to a facility not among the 16 facilities implicated in abuse by 
the UNAMA report. ISAF forces obtain assurances from the facility director or 
commander that the detainee will not be transferred to a detention facility implicated in 
abuse. 
 
ISAF is also moving forward with a long-term detainee monitoring program that will 
include facility inspections and monitoring of every detainee captured in ISAF and joint 
ISAF/ANSF operations, including those transferred outside the 16 previously identified 
facilities of concern. The focus will be on tracking individual detainees rather than 
facilities, and commits ISAF to interviewing each transferred detainee on a monthly 
basis. Each Regional Command will have two officials employed on a full time basis for 
this purpose. ISAF has not responded to AIHRC and Open Society requests for the 
number of detainees expected to be covered by this monitoring regime. 
 
Critically, ISAF has adopted a broad, inclusive definition of which detainees will 
eventually be covered by its protective measures, including its proposed monitoring 
program. ISAF’s protective measures will apply not only to individuals captured and 
detained by ISAF forces, but to all detainees captured in any combined operation between 
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ISAF forces and ANSF. This definition is broader than the “effective control” standard 
employed by many ISAF TCNs. 
 
ISAF’s swift response to UNAMA’s report and decision to suspend transfers to all 16 
facilities identified by UNAMA is a positive, welcome step. The adoption and 
implementation of a six-phase plan to address concerns raised by the UNAMA detentions 
report will help protect the rights of detainees transferred to Afghan custody and 
encourage Afghan officials to pursue improvements and reform.  
 
However, additional information will be required to assess whether ISAF inspections, 
training, and certifications are in fact ensuring detainees are not subjected to a real risk of 
torture. ISAF must also work to finalize and clarify its plan for inspecting facilities 
beyond the 16 identified by UNAMA and its proposal for longer-term detainee 
monitoring program. 
 
There is also significant concern that international monitoring programs such as ISAF’s 
result in the creation of a “two-tier” system, where transferred detainees were free from 
abuse, while the wider detainee population continued to face mistreatment. Consequently, 
there should be a priority on ensuring the AIHRC, which is mandated to monitor all 
detainees in all detention facilities, has full, unfettered access to NDS facilities. It also 
necessary that the Afghan government and international officials ensure international 
monitoring programs, including monitoring conducted by ISAF, individual troop 
contributing nations, and international organizations never substitute or undermine an 
Afghan-led, national detainee monitoring mechanism, which has both the 
comprehensiveness of mandate and enduring institutional presence critical to long-term, 
sustainable improvements in detainee treatment and conditions. 
 
 
Despite signs of genuine effort, there are also serious concerns as to whether ISAF’s 
inspections regime has been able to adequately and accurately assess the risk of torture in 
13 of the 16 facilities within such a short period of time. Experience from elsewhere in 
the world suggests that eliminating torture can be a slow process, not least because it 
often rests on changing assumptions within institutions and among officials that abusive 
methods are effective and necessary. It would be surprising if such attitudes within the 
NDS had been changed in a matter of months. Going forward, operational constraints, 
particularly those stemming from reduced troop numbers, must not lead to a lowering of 
the bar when it comes to meeting states’ legal obligations or rigorously assessing the risk 
of torture detainees will face in Afghan detention facilities. 
 
 
ISAF’s six-phase response plan is a significant, positive effort to address detainee abuse; 
however, ISAF and TCNs must learn from past mistakes and ensure that whatever 
remedial actions are taken or monitoring conducted, nations must meet their legal 
obligations to never subject a detainee to a real risk of torture.Efforts should also be made 
to ensure the AIHRC, as the national detention monitoring mechanism with a mandate to 




ISAF Troop Contributing Nations Transferring Detainees to Afghan Custody 
 
United States 
Number of transfers: Several thousand 
Facilities transferring to: Many, nationally 
Monitoring program: None 
 
Though U.S. officials are either unwilling or unable to provide exact figures on detainee 
transfers, it is clear that the United States currently transfers far more detainees to the 
Afghan government than any other ISAF nation.
101
 The United States is also the only 





According to a cable from the U.S. Embassy in Kabul, leaked by Wikileaks, in 2009 
(1388) U.S. forces under ISAF detained 643 individuals and transferred 370 to Afghan 
custody.
103
 Trends from night raids or “kill/capture” operations indicate that the number 
of individuals detained by the United States has increased sharply since then. ISAF and 
USFOR-A special operations forces together detained over 8,000 individuals between 
April 2010 and April 2011 (Hamal 1389-1390), a large proportion of which were likely 
detained by U.S. special operations forces, and marking a substantial increase in the 
number of detentions.
104
  With the population of the United States’ only long-term 
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detention facility, DFIP, currently at around 3,000, these and other figures indicate that 
the vast majority of those detained by U.S. forces are clearly being either released or 




However, the United States remains without a detainee monitoring program to ensure 
those individuals it transfers to Afghan custody are free from a real risk of torture. Going 
forward, while U.S. forces under ISAF will be covered by the proposed ISAF detainee 
monitoring program, transfers from non-ISAF U.S. forces will remain outside the scope 
of ISAF monitoring—a significant gap that is a serious cause for concern. (See section VI 
for additional information on U.S. detainee transfers and proposed monitoring program). 
 
United Kingdom 
Number of transfers: 20 per month, on average
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Facilities transferring to: NDS LashkarGah, Helmand 
Monitoring program: Military-civilian Detention Oversight Team (DOT) monitors every 
transferee 
 
The United Kingdom currently transfers on average 20 detainees per month, according to 
one U.K. official.
107
 Transfers are ongoing, but following a U.K. High Court decision in 
June 2010 and subsequent policy decisions taken by the U.K. government, U.K. forces 
are now transferring only to NDS LashkarGah, in Helmand, where most of their forces 




The United Kingdom has had detainee monitoring program since 2006, implemented by a 
Detainee Oversight Team (DOT), comprising of a Royal Military Police officer and a 
military lawyer. All post-transfer U.K. captured detainees are visited regularly and 
interviews are conducted in private, although monitoring visits are not unannounced. 
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 BBC News, “Maya Evans: Peace Activist Wins Legal Aid Court Battle,” May 12, 2011 (22 Saur 1390), 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-13371880. 
109
Queen in re: Maya Evans v. Sec’y of State for Defence, [2010] EWHC 1445 (Q.B.) (U.K.). See also 
Memorandum of Understanding between the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and 




Detainees are interviewed within 30 days of their transfer to Afghan custody, and then 
every 30 days thereafter until first conviction; if allegations of abuse are received, follow-
up visits are conducted every 15 days. Though the DOT says that it tries to conduct 










Facilities transferring to: DFIP, NDS TarinKowt, Uruzgan.  
Monitoring program: Monitor every detainee in Afghan custody and have access to 
detainees at DFIP 
 
Between August 1, 2010 (10 Asad 1389), and December 2, 2011 (11 Qaws 1390), 
Australian forces, which operate in Uruzgan province, transferred 53 detainees to Afghan 
custody at NDS TarinKowt and 34 detainees to US custody at the DFIP.
112
After initial 
screening, Australian forces transfer detainees deemed to be higher-level security risk are 
transferred to U.S. custody at DFIP, while those deemed as less serious security threats 
are transferred to NDS TarinKowt, the capital of Uruzgan.
113
 As NDS has no holding 
facilities in TarinKowt, detainees are physically held at the Attorney-General’s office, 
which is located across the street from the NDS. 
 
Australia currently monitors all of the detainees it transfers into Afghan or US custody to 
assess their ongoing treatment and welfare. Monitoring is conducted via initial visits 
shortly after their transfer and then on a monthly basis thereafter until the detainee is 




As part of its monitoring responsibilities for detainees, Australia also inspects the 
facilities and the conditions where Australian Defence Forces (ADF)-apprehended 
detainees are held, but does not usually inspect facilities where detainees are not 
transferred by Australian elements. Monitoring visits in Uruzgan are unannounced, while 
visits to DFIP are organized in advance due to logistical and access reasons. Visits in 
TarinKowt at all facilities (NDS/Attorney-General’s Office and the TarinKowt central 
prison) are conducted in private, while visits to DFIP are recorded in accordance with US 
requirements. 
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Interview with Australian government official, Kabul city, Kabul Province, Afghanistan, October 14, 2011 
(22 Mizan 1390). 
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Information provided by Australian government official, March 17, 2012 (27 Hoot 1390). 
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Allegations of detainee mistreatment are, with the detainee’s consent, raised with the 
detaining authority and, if possible, investigated. Allegations are also reported through 
the Australian Ambassador, Australian Chain of Command, and to ISAF and relevant 
human rights organizations. In the event that the Australian Government becomes aware 
of a credible allegation or reasonable suspicion of detainee mistreatment within a 
particular detention facility, the Australian government may consider suspending 
transfers of detainees to that facility pending investigation. Australia halted detainee 






Number of transfers: None, last in July 2011 (Saratan 1390) 
Facilities transferring to: DFIP 
Monitoring program: Monitor all detainees still in Afghan custody and have access to 
detainees in DFIP 
 
Canada officially ended combat operations in July 2011 (Saratan 1390), and now 
maintains only a training mission. In December 2011 (Qaws 1390), Canada signed an 
agreement with the United States to transfer all individuals captured by its forces to U.S. 
custody at DFIP, though the likelihood of Canada detaining further individuals without 
combat troops present is low.   
 
Canada first signed an MoU in 2005 with the Afghan government, but included no 
provision for monitoring or oversight (unlike the Dutch and British MoUs of the time).
116
 
In 2006, Canadian government officials reported internally that torture was taking place 
in facilities in Kandahar. In 2009, the former chargé d’ affaires in the Canadian Embassy 
in Kabul, Richard Colvin, told the Canadian House of Commons that, “according to our 
information, the likelihood is that all the Afghans we handed over were tortured. For 
interrogators in Kandahar, it was standard operating procedure.” Under political and 








 Testimony of Richard Colvin, formerly acting ambassador at the Canadian Embassy in Kabul, addressing 
the Canadian House of Commons, November 18, 2009 (27 Aqrab 1388), 
http://www.parl.gc.ca/HousePublications/Publication.aspx?DocId=4236267&Language=E&Mode=1&Parl=
40&Ses=2, [hereinafter “Testimony of Richard Colvin”]. 
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May 5, 2010 (15 Saur 1389), 
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Since 2007, civilian Canadian government officials have conducted post-transfer 
monitoring visits to assess the conditions of detention and treatment of Canadian-
transferred detainees held in Afghan facilities, through regular visits to a limited number 
of designated detention facilities in Kabul and Kandahar. At least one case of torture was 
still discovered after the monitoring system was put in place, which, according to Colvin, 





While Canada no longer has combat forces in Afghanistan, it continues to monitor every 
detainee that it has previously transferred to Afghan custody, all of whom are now held in 
the MOI-run Sarpoza prison in Kandahar.  
 
Denmark 
Number of transfers: Seven in total
119
 
Facilities transferring to: NDS LashkarGah, Helmand 
Monitoring program: Monitor all detainees 
 
All detainees captured by Danish forces are transferred to NDS LashkarGah—only seven 
have been transferred since 2005, five of whom have since been released while two 




Danish representatives monitor all detainees from point of transfer to Afghan custody, 
until release, with regular, unannounced visits and private interviews with the detainees. 
Visits are conducted by a medical officer and a lawyer.  
 
Meeting International Legal Obligations and Effective Detainee Monitoring 
Under the general international law principle of non-refoulement, which has a basis in 
international human rights, refugee, and humanitarian law, states are prohibited from 
transferring persons under their effective control to the custody of another state if there 
are substantial grounds to believe the individual would face a real risk of torture or cruel, 
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.
121
 Monitoring programs by ISAF and 
                                                          
118
Testimony of Richard Colvin, supra note 121.  
119
Interview with Danish government official, Kabul city, Kabul province, October 17, 2011 (25 Mizan 
1390). 
120
Interview with Danish government official, Kabul city, Kabul province, October 17, 2011 (25 Mizan 
1390).Written email responses of Danish government to Open Society Foundations questions on 
detention policies and practices, November 28, 2011 (7 Qaws 1390), and December 20, 2011 (29 Qaws 
1390). See also Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Denmark in Afghanistan: Detainees,” 
http://www.afghanistan.um.dk/en/menu/DenmarkinAfghanistan/DenmarksIntegratedApproach/Detaine
es/; Memorandum of the Understanding between the Ministry of Defense of the Islamic Republic or 
Afghanistan and the Ministry of Defense of the Kingdom of Denmark concerning the transfer of persons 
between the Danish Contingent of the International Security Assistance Force and Afghan Authorities, 
June 8, 2005 (18 Jaws 1384), http://www.afghanistan.um.dk/NR/rdonlyres/97DB19DB-2A1D-4C6E-92A1-
742671501049/0/DKAFGoverdragelsesaftale.pdf.  
121
The principle of non-refoulement is a general principle of international law with a basis in international 




troop contributing nations are welcome steps and can greatly enhance detainee protection. 
However, monitoring alone is not sufficient to meet states’ legal obligations, and 
experience has shown that the effectiveness of monitoring depends greatly on the 
circumstances and varies widely.  
 
Because fulfilling the legal obligation of non-refoulement requires ensuring that every 
detainee transferred to another state’s custody is free from a real risk of torture, post-
transfer monitoring alone is insufficient. 
122
 In order to avoid transferring detainees into 
circumstances in which they are subject to a real risk of torture, states must assess the risk 
at a particular facility prior to transfer—post-facto determinations are insufficient. 
Authoritative legal interpretations and jurisprudence indicate that states should also 
afford detainees certain procedural guarantees, such as informing the detainee of the 
decision to transfer and providing them an opportunity to express concerns that transfer 
would expose them to a real risk of torture or ill-treatment.
123
 Guidance from legal 
authorities and practitioners indicates that properly assessing the risk of torture requires 
states to implement measures that would “take into account all relevant considerations,” 
such as facility-wide inspections, interviews with non-transferred detainees, and the 
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Ibid. See also Committee against Torture, General Comment No. 1, Implementation of article 3 of the 




States that do implement monitoring programs must also genuinely assess the 
effectiveness of such programs in policy terms, mindful of the dynamic and challenging 
circumstances in Afghanistan, as well as those practices that are critical to effective 
monitoring. Visits should be unannounced and states must have full access to detainees 
and facilities. Interviews with detainees should be conducted in private and in 
confidence.
125
 Ideally post-release interviews should also be carried out, when fears of 
reprisals will be somewhat reduced. Monitors should also assess whether detainees’ due 
process rights are violated, including access to counsel and family members—rights that 
are critical to protecting detainees from abuse. Monitoring teams should be adequately 
resourced, and include civilian professionals with expertise and experience in detainee 




In addition, effective and sustainable monitoring systems must be sure to complement 
and work with national, civilian organizations, like the AIHRC—the national and 
constitutionally-mandated institution with a long-term commitment to monitoring. 
Crucially, the AIHRC is an organization committed to monitoring the treatment of all 
detainees, rather than focusing on those transferred by international forces. States seeking 
to meet their legal obligations should engage cooperatively with the AIHRC, and ensure 
its monitors also have full, unfettered access to all detainees and detention facilities. 
 
Joint Operations and Intelligence Sharing 
ISAF nations also have legal obligations with respect to detainee treatment arising from 
their cooperation with Afghan security and intelligence forces. Many ISAF nations 
conduct combined, or joint operations with Afghan forces, in the course of which 
individuals may be detained. Following these operations, detainees are often taken into 
Afghan custody, where they could be at risk of ill-treatment or torture. Some ISAF 
TCNs, including Germany, have failed to reach agreements with the Afghan government 
regarding transfers, and have instead adopted a policy of taking part in joint operations 
with ANSF without “arresting” individuals.127 
 
The participation of Afghan forces in joint operations is in most cases unlikely to absolve 
international forces of their legal obligations to those individuals captured in such 
operations. International forces play a critical role in joint operations, from logistical and 
intelligence assistance to force protection; they are often effectively in the lead during 
such operations as well as physically present and protecting ANSF soldiers while they 
take individuals into custody. Consequently, international forces must examine their 
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forces’ specific involvement in joint operations to determine whether they have any legal 
obligations to those captured—a determination that cannot be reduced to the mere 
presence of Afghan forces during an operation or the fact that it is Afghan forces that 
physically take individuals into custody. Instead, the degree and nature of international 
forces’ involvement in joint operations must be genuinely assessed to determine whether 
those detained in the course of operations come within international forces’ effective 




In a welcome move, ISAF officials have stated that, as a matter of policy, ISAF 
protective measures (as opposed to the policy of individual troop contributing nations) 
will be triggered not just when individuals come under the effective control of ISAF 
forces, but whenever an individual is captured in combined ISAF/ANSF operations.
129
 
However, effective control remains the prevailing legal standard applied by each ISAF 
nation’s forces. In interviews for this report, officials from some nations indicated that 
obligations to those captured in joint operations are taken into account, but no nation 
would specify how it defines effective control and under what circumstances their forces’ 
participation in joint operations would trigger obligations undernon-refoulement.  
 
Intelligence sharing is a further concern. Given the widespread use of coercive and 
abusive interrogation methods by Afghan intelligence officials, there is a significant risk 
that intelligence gathered by Afghan authorities is gathered through torture. International 
allies should avoid sharing Afghan intelligence unless they can ensure that in doing so 
they are in no way complicit with torture or ill-treatment by Afghan authorities, an 
obligation which arises regardless of whether detainees were transferred from 
international forces’ custody.130 However, in interviews with various foreign government 
officials, no ISAF nation indicated that it had implemented measures to ensure that 
intelligence gathered by Afghan authorities and then shared and utilized by their forces 




An ongoing concern is continued cooperation by non-ISAF special operations forces and 
CIA personnel, who are believed to maintain a relationship with NDS officials, in 
particular from Department 90/124, which involves visits by some personnel to the 
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 Although U.S. officials themselves have not been directly implicated in 
torture, close cooperation between U.S. and Afghan intelligence officials, particularly at 
NDS Department 90/124, would raise serious concerns that U.S. officials could be 
complicit in torture and ill-treatment perpetrated by Afghan intelligence officials.  
 
VI. Torture and Mistreatment of U.S. Detainees Transferred to NDS 
 
Researchers documented a number of credible cases in which individuals were detained 
by U.S. forces and then transferred to Afghan custody, where they were reportedly 
subjected to torture, including beatings, suspension, and electric shock.  
 
10 cases of individuals detained by U.S. forces transferred to NDS facilities where they 
reported being tortured between May 2010 and January 2012 (Saur 1389-Jadi 1390).
133
 In 
four of these cases individuals reported being held for some period of time at a detention 
facility located at or near Bagram Air Base, and in four cases individuals were transferred 
to NDS Kandahar despite such transfers being suspended by all ISAF as well as USFOR-
A forces. These cases are strong evidence that U.S. detainee transfers have in fact been 
tortured by NDS officials. They raise serious concerns regarding U.S. policies on 
transfers to NDS, particularly transfers by U.S. special operations forces, and whether 
appropriate safeguards exist to protect detainees’ rights and ensure that the United States 
is not complicit in torture. 
 
U.S. Detainees Transferred to Afghan Custody from “Bagram” and other U.S. 
Detention Facilities 
In four cases, individuals interviewed by researchers for this report said that they were 
arrested by U.S. forces between May 2010 (Saur 1389) and May 2011 (Saur 1390) and 
held at “Bagram.” All four individuals said that they were then held by the NDS in 
incommunicado detention, without charge, and subjected to various forms of torture.  
 
There is some uncertainty regarding precisely which facility detainees were at when they 
describe being held at “Bagram,” as this could mean either the long-term U.S. detention 
facility, DFIP, or the Joint Special Operations Command-run (JSOC) screening or 
“transit” detention facility at Bagram Air Base, known as “Black Jail” or “Tor Jail.” U.S. 
officials have stated to the AIHRC and the Open Society Foundations that detainees at 
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DFIP are not transferred directly into NDS facilities, indicating that it is more likely 
detainees were held at the transit detention facility at Bagram Air Base.
134
 Instead, 
according to the officials, detainees are either released through shuras or are transferred 
to the Afghan-controlled block at DFIP for prosecution.
135
 None of the detainees reported 
being through a Detainee Review Board (DRB) hearing or a release shura. U.S. officials 
would not comment on whether detainees who are held at JSOC facilities, including the 




Detainees’ descriptions of the conditions in which they were held, specifically small, 
windowless single person cells, excessive light, insufficient water for ablutions before 
prayer, and noises that interfered with sleep, are consistent with conditions of 
confinement at the JSOC-run temporary detention or screening facility at or near Bagram 
Air Field documented in previous Open Society reporting.
137
 This facility is located near 
to both the DFIP and its predecessor, the Bagram Theater Internment Facility (BTIF), 
likely producing some confusion. Since detainees are not informed of where they are 
being held, identifying the location of their detention must be based on their recollections 
of confinement conditions, physical descriptions, treatment, interrogations, and other 
details that could help substantiate the exact detention location. Based on this information 
and information compiled by Open Society on the JSOC temporary detention facility at 
Bagram, it is likely that all of the four detainees in question spent some time at this 
facility.
138
 Whether the detainees may also have been held at DFIP is less likely.  
  
Of the four detainees transferred from U.S. custody at DFIP or the temporary detention 
facility at Bagram to NDS, two were transferred to NDS Wardak, one to NDS Laghman, 
and one to NDS Kabul Department 90/124, where they report being subjected to torture, 
including beating, suspension, and electric shock.
139
 One of the detainees transferred to 
NDS Wardak was also subsequently transferred to Kabul Department 90/124, where he 
alleges he was again subjected to torture. Detainees reported being held by the United 
States at DFIP/Tor Jail anywhere from 20 days to six months.  
 
In two additional cases, interviewees said that they were held by U.S. forces at temporary 
detention facilities in the provinces of their capture, and then transferred directly to NDS 
custody, where they were subsequently tortured.  
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Two detainees told the researchers for this report that they were transferred directly from 
U.S. detention facilities to NDS; one detainee reported being transferred from Jalalabad 
airfield to NDS Nangarhar, and then to NDS Kabul Department 90/124, where he says he 
was subjected to torture, including beating and suspension. The other detainee was 
transferred from a U.S. detention site in Laghman to NDS Laghman, where he reported 




No detainees reported any physical abuse by U.S. forces while in detention in U.S. 
detention facilities and several noted that they were well-treated, particularly in 
comparison to their treatment while in Afghan custody.  
 
In none of the cases did detainees report being informed of the basis for their arrest and 
detention by U.S. forces, nor were they provided with specific reasons for their release or 
transfer by U.S. forces.  
 
According to one detainee who was held at either DFIP or the temporary detention 
facility at Bagram Air Base for approximately two and a half months, “One day the 
Americans came and said they were going to release me, they said that they had made a 
mistake. I thought that they would release me from there, but instead they gave me to the 
NDS. I was so happy at first, I thought I would be free, but I didn’t realize this was just 
the beginning.”141 Another detainee held at “Bagram” stated that U.S. forces suggested to 
him that he was cleared of wrongdoing and would be set free. “The interpreter came in 
and said we have good news for you, the investigation is over and you will be released. I 
asked if this was a joke, and he said, no, the U.S. does not joke about these things.” But 
instead of being released, he was handed over to NDS Wardak in MaidanShar. “They 
restarted the interrogations. I said, ‘look, I’ve already been investigated by the U.S., I’m 
not the one you’re looking for.’”142 Over the course of the next week, he was repeatedly 
suspended upside-down from the ceiling and beaten with electric cables, wooden sticks, 
and metal rods.  
 
Transferred Detainees Subjected to Torture 
In all six of the above cases, where individuals were transferred from U.S. custody 
directly to the NDS, the interviewees said that both Afghans and Americans were present 
on the raids, and that they were held at U.S. detention facilities where they were 
interrogated for a short period of time. The first of these arrests was in May 2010 
(approximately Saur 1389), and the most recent arrest was in May 2011 (Saur 1390). All 
six detainees transferred from U.S. to NDS custody reported forms of mistreatment and 
abuse consistent with accounts provided by other detainees in NDS custody, including 
suspension, beatings, electric shocks, and denial of medical care. All six cases occurred 
within the last year and a half.  
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Two detainees described being suspended while in custody at NDS Wardak.
143
 In both 
cases, the detainees’ feet were bound and tied to a rope, which was threaded through a 
pulley on the ceiling. Some detainees who were hung upside-down by their feet from the 
ceiling were also beaten. Another detainee reported being suspended in NDS Kabul 
Department 90/124. He was hung upside-down by chains attached to cuffs around his 




All six detainees reported being beaten multiple times, over periods ranging from one 
week to many months. The beatings were administered through a variety of methods, 
including kicking, slapping, punching, and beating with tools such as rubber hoses, 
electric cables, wooden sticks, and metal rods. Detainees reported being beaten on 
multiple areas of their body, including the legs, backside, head, and the soles of their feet. 
Detainees were beaten in a variety of positions, including while standing, sitting and 
bound in chairs, suspended from the ceiling, and lying face down on the floor or on a bed. 
Two of the six detainees described their hands being bound, and NDS officials holding 
their feet out in front of them—in one case binding them to a stick—and being beaten on 




“They beat me twice a day, once in the morning, once in the evening. They beat me on 
my arms, my legs, and backside. They used sticks, electric cables, and metal rods. After 
that you could see the marks, the welts; you could even tell differences between the 
marks—that this one is from the stick, this one from cable, this one from the metal.”146 
 
Two detainees reported being subjected to electric shocks. “They used to bind my hands 
and tie me to a chair and put clips on two of my toes. Then they would have this machine 
for electricity, they would crank it up and give us shocks. It was very hard and we would 
be screaming in pain.”147 Describing the pain of the electric shocks, another detainee said, 
“It felt like I was half-dead. All my body was trembling and shaking, and my heart was 
beating very quickly, but I wasn’t able to move or speak.”  
 
Upon being transferred to the NDS, none of the six detainees were ever charged or 
brought before a judge. After having little to no contact with family while in U.S. 
custody, transfer to the NDS meant many more months of incommunicado detention—a 
clear violation of detainees’ fundamental due process rights that also substantially 
increases the risk of torture. The detainees’ families lacked any knowledge of their 
condition or whereabouts. In two cases, even when family members managed to locate 
detainees, they reported having to pay bribes to NDS officials to secure their release.   
 
One detainee stated that he was in U.S. custody at “Bagram” for approximately six 
months before being transferred to NDS Kabul, where he remained for an additional three 
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months. It was not until he was released from NDS, dropped off on a main road outside 
the detention facility, and handed 1,000 Afghanis (approximately U.S.$20), that he could 
call his family to inform them where he was, after a total of approximately nine months 
in detention. “My family had no news, no information at all, they didn’t know where I 
was, if I was at Bagram, NDS, or Kabul, or wherever. When I got out I didn’t even know 
where I was. It was somewhere in Kabul, but I don’t know the city very well. It was hard 
to walk. I was dizzy and confused. Some people found me and after I told them what 
happened they took me to a restaurant, gave me some tea and food and I called my 
brother and I told him to come and find me. He started crying.”148 
 
These cases highlight a potential practice in which some U.S. forces seem to be 
detaining, interrogating, and screening individuals, and then transferring some of them to 
Afghan officials and facilities that engage in torture. In four of the cases investigated, 
detainees were transferred to and subjected to torture at NDS facilities where ISAF has 
since suspended transfers as a result of reports of abuse, including NDS Laghman and 
Department 90/124.   
 
U.S. Detainees Transferred to NDS Kandahar despite ISAF/USFOR-A Transfer 
Suspension 
Researchers have documented eleven recent, credible cases in which individuals reported 
being detained by U.S. forces and subsequently transferred to NDS Kandahar despite a 
July 2011 (Saratan 1390)order suspending all detainee transfers to NDS Kandahar due to 
reports of detainee abuse. The most recent transfer reportedly occurred in January 2012 
(Jadi 1390). 
 
In July 2011 (Saratan 1390), in response to reports of detainee abuse, COM-ISAF and 
U.S. Forces-Afghanistan (USFOR-A) issued an order suspending all detainee transfers to 
NDS Kandahar. According to ISAF and U.S. officials, this order still stands and all U.S. 





However, eleven detainees interviewed for this report described being detained by U.S. 
forces and transferred to NDS Kandahar since the COM-ISAF and USFOR-A orders. 
Detainees stated that they were detained by “Americans” or “U.S. forces,” or “U.S. 
special forces,” or sometimes “foreign forces,” and held for 1-2 days before being 
transferred to NDS Kandahar. Five detainees stated specifically that they were held at 
“Mullah Omar’s House.” 
 
Firebase Maholic, also known by its previous name, Camp Gecko, is often locally 
referred to as “Mullah Omar’s House,” a reference to the facility’s well-known past as 
the residence of Taliban leader Mullah Omar. The facility has been used for many years 
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as a base for the C.I.A. and U.S. special operations forces operating in Kandahar.
150
 The 
base is also reportedly home to Afghan forces including the paramilitary unit known as 
the “Kandahar Strike Force.” According to reports, the Kandahar Strike Force was 
assembled and trained by U.S. special operations and C.I.A. personnel and continues to 
work closely with U.S. special operations and intelligence personnel conducting raids and 




One detainee interviewed by the AIHRC reported being arrested by U.S. forces, and 
abused by Afghan forces while in the presence of  “Americans” at Firebase Maholic. “I 
was in Mullah Omar’s House and they blindfolded my eyes and made me sit on a chair 
for a few hours. After a moment of silence suddenly lashes of cable struck my head and 
back very hard from behind, they beat me for one hour. They wanted me to tell them who 
I had relations with. They were all Afghans beating me, though the beating took place in 
the presence of Americans. Afghan forces beat me with the Americans there.”152 It 
should be noted that researchers received no other claims of U.S. forces present during 
abuse of detainees, and this account could not be independently verified. 
 
Another detainee reported being arrested by “U.S. forces” during a raid on his home and 
taken to a location that he guessed was “Mullah Omar’s House,” and beaten by Afghan 
officers there. “They took me blindfolded to somewhere, my guess is that it was Mullah 
Omar’s house, where I was beaten and tortured badly by Afghan soldiers and officials. 
They beat me on the feet, legs and back by something like a cable. The beating continued 
for a few hours until I felt numb in my back and legs, and it burned with pain on my feet 
and on the soles of my feet. They punched and kicked me also, and the next day I was 
transferred to the NDS.”153 The detainee stated that he had not been mistreated while in 
NDS custody, and at the time of the interview, there were marks consistent with beatings 
visible on the detainee’s back and feet. Some detainees report being treated well while in 
U.S. custody for 1-2 nights, before being transferred to NDS Kandahar.   
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Four detainees transferred to NDS officials in Kandahar by “U.S. forces” reported being 
subsequently tortured by NDS. According to one detainee, “I was severely beaten by 
cable in the head and neck. I was shackled and they connected the shackles to an 
electrical current and shocked me until I was unconscious. They also beat me on the back 
and waist very hard. As a result, my left hand is still hurting and even my tongue is 
severely damaged from the electric shock.”154Three other transferred detainees also 
alleged that they were abused in NDS Kandahar, including being subjected to beatings 
with cables. 
 
In response to queries regarding these cases, U.S. military officials have stated that there 
are “no ISAF or USFOR-A forces transferring detainees to NDS Kandahar,” and that the 
order suspending transfers to NDS Kandahar among other facilities in RC-South remain 
in full effect.
155
  Interviews with detainees as well as responses by U.S. officials to 
queries from the AIHRC and the Open Society Foundations indicate that there may be 
U.S. forces or personnel, perhaps including C.I.A. or other U.S. intelligence officials, 
operating outside ISAF and USFOR-A commands in Kandahar that are detaining 
individuals and transferring them to NDS Kandahar.  
 
These transfers are occurring despite widely held and long-standing concerns about 
torture and detainee abuse at NDS Kandahar. ISAF and U.S. forces first prohibited 
transfers to NDS Kandahar in July 2011 (Saratan 1390), and had received reports of 
abuse from independent monitors for several years prior. The United Kingdom suspended 
transfers to NDS Kandahar in January 2011 (Jadi 1389).AIHRC monitors received 10 
credible allegations of abuse in NDS Kandahar as recently as January 2012 (Jadi 1390), 
indicating that detainee abuse continues to be a serious problem. 
 
Yet there is compelling evidence that at least some U.S. forces or personnel continue to 
transfer individuals to NDS Kandahar despite not only a widely acknowledged risk of 
torture but also evidence that detainees transferred to NDS Kandahar by U.S. forces have 
been subjected to torture. 
 
It is important that the transfer policies of all U.S. forces and agencies are made clear, 
and that they meet their obligations to refrain from transferring detainees to facilities 
where they face a real risk of torture. It is unclear whether and under what circumstances 
U.S. policy permits detainee transfers from JSOC-run and other temporary detention 
facilities or from U.S. forces and personnel operating outside ISAF and USFOR-A chains 
of command to the NDS. 
 
Lack of U.S. Detainee Monitoring Program 
Despite the high number of detainees transferred by U.S. forces to Afghan custody, the 
United States has yet to implement a detainee monitoring program to ensure detainees are 
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free from a real risk of torture. While the U.S. has a role in ISAF’s proposed detainee 
monitoring program, this monitoring element of the ISAF program will not cover 
detainees transferred by U.S. forces outside ISAF—a significant gap, particularly with 
respect to U.S special forces under the Combined Forces Special Operations Component 
Command-Afghanistan (CFSOCC-A), which carry out a significant number of detention 
operations. The AIHRC is also not informed of U.S. forces’ detainee transfers, leaving 
such detainees largely uncovered by a specific detainee monitoring program. 
 
The United States remains the only ISAF nation with a long-term detention facility, the 
Detention Facility in Parwan (DFIP). In recent years, the United States has made 
significant improvements in its detention policies and practices, particularly by ensuring 
proper confinement conditions at DFIP and ensuring detainees are free from abuse.
156
 
Due process for detainees has been slightly improved through the adoption of Detainee 
Review Boards (DRBs), though serious concerns remain, including detainees still not 
being afforded a meaningful opportunity to challenge the grounds for their arrest and 
continued detention. Both the AIHRC and Open Society have welcomed the opportunity 
to conduct visits been to DFIP and DRBs, when the U.S. government has granted access, 
and the AIHRC and Open Society have engaged productively with U.S. officials on a 




However, the United States has made disappointingly little progress on ensuring the 
rights of transferred detainees are protected. Creation of a U.S. monitoring program to 
ensure transferred detainees are not subjected to torture has proceeded at a disappointing 
pace. As early as 2009, a U.S. Inter-Agency Task Force on Interrogation and Transfer 
Policies recommended physically monitoring the status of transferred detainees.
158
 In 
February 2010 (Dalwa 1388), the U.S. State Department proposed adopting a detainee 
monitoring program, noting not only the significant number of detainees being 
transferred from U.S. to Afghan custody, but also NGO reports of torture and ill-
treatment of detainees in Afghan custody.
159
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U.S. government officials informed the AIHRC and Open Society that the United States 
is currently in negotiations with the Afghan government to create a U.S. Embassy-led 
monitoring program to monitor transferred detainees.
160
 Negotiations are ongoing and 




The United States has also signed agreements with the Afghan government on post-
transfer monitoring in the past, yet ultimately failed to follow through on 
implementation.
162
 While an agreement between the U.S. and Afghan governments on a 
detainee monitoring plan would be welcome, implementation is what matters most. 
 
The United States clearly faces challenges in implementing such a program, many of 
which are substantially different from those faced by other ISAF nations. The United 
States detains and transfers far more individuals than any other nation, and transfers to a 
large number of Afghan facilities, located in many different areas of the country. Many 
detainees are also subsequently transferred between different Afghan government 
institutions and facilities. Nevertheless, the United States, like every other ISAF nation, 
has a strict and absolute legal obligation not to transfer any detainee into circumstances in 
which he or she will be exposed to a real risk of torture. 
 
That the United States is moving forward with plans for implementing some form of 
detainee monitoring is a welcome step, as is its involvement in the creation of an ISAF 
detainee monitoring program. However, concerns remain as to whether a U.S. monitoring 
program, be it specific to the United States or part of an ISAF program, will be capable of 
satisfying its legal obligations. The proposed U.S. program will not monitor every 
detainee transferred into custody, as other nations do. Instead, the proposal envisions 
conducting interviews with select samples of detainees. There are also concerns of 
monitoring giving rise to a “two-tier system” in which U.S. transferred detainees are 
given preferential treatment—the same risk raised by ISAF monitoring or any detainee 
monitoring program that only assesses the treatment and conditions of transferred 
detainees. Given the sheer number of detainees and facilities that must be monitored as 
well as the frequency of visits required, significant resources are needed to properly 
engage in detainee monitoring, including an appropriate number of experienced monitors 
as well as the transportation and security resources necessary to conduct regular visits. 
 
Given widespread reports of torture and ill-treatment, as well as the documented failings 
of other detainee monitoring programs, it remains unclear whether even a robust, well-
resourced U.S. monitoring program will be sufficient to ensure that transferred detainees 
are free from torture. Furthermore, having committed to playing such an integral role in 
working with the Afghan government to improve rule of law, the United States. has a 
broader obligation to try to ensure that the wider prison population is not subjected to 
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torture. To this end, the United States should also take steps to ensure the AIHRC, which 
has a national, constitutional mandate to monitor all detainees, is afforded full, unfettered 
access to detention facilities. Any U.S. detainee monitoring program should also engage 
cooperatively with the AIHRC to ensure all detainees are free from abuse. 
 
The cases of abuse and torture documented in this report underscore the urgent need for 
such efforts to ensure that the United States meets its legal obligations and never subjects 
detainees to a real risk of torture. 
 
VII. Due Process Violations 
 
Research shows that NDS officials regularly violate the due process rights of conflict-
related detainees, subjecting individuals to prolonged, incommunicado detention without 
charge and without access to counsel.
163
 The violation of these fundamental due process 
rights significantly increases the risk of torture. Addressing these due process violations, 
particularly lack of access to counsel and family members, could greatly reduce the 
vulnerability of detainee to torture, and should be a priority for the Afghan government 
and international forces. 
 
The NDS reportedly operates under a number of presidential decrees that are not public 
and unpublished, despite repeated requests from national and international human rights 
organizations. In general, the opacity of the legal authority of the NDS frustrates effective 
oversight and accountability, and increases the likelihood of abuse. Despite the secretive 
nature of some of the rules governing the NDS, there are fundamental rights that are 
afforded all detainees under applicable Afghan law, including the constitution, the 
Afghan Penal Code, and the Interim Criminal Procedure Code (ICPC), as well as under 




Researchers of this report have reviewed an unpublished copy of the National Security 
Law, which reportedly governs the authority of NDS.
165
 Though the National Security 
Law grants the NDS the power to “organize, arrest, and detain in accordance with the 
provisions of the Law of Crimes against Internal and External Security,” there is no 
provision in the law that grants NDS the authority to detain individuals beyond 72 hours, 
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hold individuals incommunicado, deny access to counsel, or violate any other due process 
rights afforded individuals under the ICPC and the Constitution.  
 
Interviews for this report with detainees and defense lawyers, as well as UNAMA’s 
findings, confirm that NDS officials regularly retain custody of detainees beyond the 72-
hour time limit established by the ICPC, and prevent individuals from notifying family 
members, and accessing counsel.
166
 Defense lawyers are also consistently prevented from 
participating in investigations and are sometimes subject to intimidation. 
 
The NDS exercises the power to both investigate and detain, which, in an environment 
where the rule of law is already weak, increases the risk of abuse.  The conduct of 
investigations is a responsibility that under Afghan law normally belongs to prosecutors. 
In general, having both detention and investigative authority resting with the same state 
officials increases the risk that detainees’ rights will be violated and that they will be 




Pre-Trial Detention in Violation of Legal Time Limits 
Interviews with detainees and defense lawyers, in addition to documentation by other 
organizations, clearly establish that NDS regularly holds detainees for purposes of 
interrogation well in excess of the 72-hour time limit established by Afghan law.
168
 The 
vast majority of detainees interviewed were held by NDS beyond 72 hours—many for 
several weeks or months. Such prolonged periods of pre-trial detention not only are in 




Under the Interim Criminal Procedure Code (ICPC), suspects can be held by police for 
no more than 72 hours before they must be handed over to a prosecutor (also known as 
                                                          
166
Interim Criminal Procedure Code, Official Gazette, No. 820 (25 February 2004; 6 Hoot 1382) 
[hereinafter “ICPC”], Art. 31, 34, and 36. Another major issue is the inability of detainees to challenge the 
lawfulness of their detention before a judge, and unclear legal grounds for pre-indictment and pre-trial 
detention. UNAMA, Arbitrary Detention in Afghanistan, Vol. II, supra note 45. 
167
 General Recommendations UN Special Rapporteur on Torture, (g), 
http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Issues/SRTorture/recommendations.pdf; UNAMA, Conflict Related 
Detainees in Afghan Custody], supra note 3. See also, Open Society Justice Initiative, Pre-Trial Detainees 
and Torture: Why Pre-Trial Detainees Face the Greatest Risk, Open Society Justice 
Initiative,http://www.soros.org/initiatives/justice/articles_publications/publications/pretrial-detention-
and-torture-20110624/pretrial-detention-and-torture-06222011.pdf [hereinafter “Open Society Justice 
Initiative, Pre-Trial Detainees and Torture”]. 
168
ICPC Art.15, 25; Interim Criminal Procedure Code, Official Gazette, No. 820 (25 February 2004; 6 Hoot 
1382), Art 31, 34., [hereinafter ICPC], 
http://www.asianlii.org/af/legis/laws/icocpfcogn820p2004022513821206a675/. 
See also UNAMA, Conflict-Related Detainees in Afghan Custody, supra note 3. 
169
 UNAMA, Conflict-Related Detainees in Afghan Custody, supra note 3, p. 44. See also Open Society 
Justice Initiative, Pre-Trial Detainees and Torture, supra note 173. Martin Schönteich, “The Scale and 
Consequences of Pretrial Detention around the World,” in Justice Initiatives: Pretrial Detention (New York: 





 Suspects must be informed of the reason for their arrest within 24 
hours. Only prosecutors and courts may extend pre-indictment detention beyond the 
initial 72 hours, and in all cases suspects should be transferred from NDS or police 




The detention of suspects beyond the 72-hour time limit is a widespread, well-
documented problem in the criminal justice system in Afghanistan.
172
 Whereas lack of 
capacity and delay on the part of prosecutors are the most common causes of prolonged 
police detention of ordinary criminal suspects, for conflict-related detainees, the NDS has 
deliberately used its power to retain custody of suspects to conduct investigations and 
interrogations, and prosecutors have delegated or abdicated their investigative 




One detainee was first arrested by international forces in December 2010 (Qaws 
1389)and soon after handed over to NDS Kabul.  “I spent 30 days in Department 90, and 
was tortured for 21 days of that month. They said to me, ‘If you are not tortured you will 
never tell us the truth.’” He remained in NDS custody for a total of three months before 
he was transferred to MOJ custody. While in NDS custody, the detainee was subjected to 
beatings as well as sexual abuse, after which he signed a confession.
174
 Such prolonged, 
pre-trial detention by the NDS, apparently for the purpose of continuing investigations, 
was regularly reported by detainees.  
 
Defense lawyers also complain about prolonged periods of detention by the NDS, and say 
that when challenged, NDS officials contend that they have the legal authority to detain 
individuals beyond the 72-hour time limit. As one defense lawyer stated: “The law is 72 
hours, but they will keep them for many months. They should be charged after 72 hours 
and handed to prosecutors. But if you say it’s illegal, the NDS says it has the right under 
the law—we ask to see this law and the directorate can’t show it. To our knowledge it has 
no such authority.”175 There is no publicly available evidence, executive order, or law 
that grants the NDS legal authority to detain individuals beyond the legally mandated 72-
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hour time limit. If the Afghan government or NDS officials defend such detention 
practices as legal, then they must make public those laws or presidential decrees that 
grant the NDS such authority.  
 
Regardless of the legal authority of the NDS, numerous defense lawyers alleged that the 
NDS retains custody of detainees in order to ensure that any evidence of physical abuse 
and torture is no longer apparent—so that injuries such as marks, cuts, and bruises caused 
by physical abuse have healed. One lawyer interviewed said, “They need to keep them in 
detention for a longer time to treat the injury, and for it to heal. If the injury is not visible, 
the court is not likely to believe the detainee.”176 
 
Incommunicado Detention 
Holding detainees in detention incommunicado, primarily by preventing family 
notification, is a violation of detainees’ rights under Afghan law and contravenes 
international human rights standards.
177
 Most detainees were also unable to communicate 
with defense counsel, which is discussed in the following section.  
Based on interviews with detainees, family contact for detainees in NDS custody, 
particularly in the first days after their initial arrest, appears to be the exception rather 
than the rule, a practice that increases the risk of mistreatment and torture.
178
 In some 
cases, NDS officials appear to have held individuals in incommunicado detention, and 
only after obtaining confessions through the use of torture were detainees transferred to 
MOI facilities, where they were allowed to contact their families. 
 
One detainee reported spending three weeks in NDS custody in Kandahar, where he was 
subjected to suspension, beating, and electrocution.  “They said confess, confess. Then 
they would beat us more; whatever they wanted us to say, we did. A human is very weak 
and so we confessed, we had no choice. The beating stopped after we confessed. All of us 
then moved here to Sarposa [Kandahar Central Jail].” The detainee’s family attempted to 
locate him throughout his time with the NDS. “It was 20 days after arresting me before 
my family found me. They went to many sources, AIHRC, NDS, ANP, and asked all of 
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them where I was, but no one gave them any information. When I arrived at the central 
jail they were able to find me.”179 
 
Another detainee had been at NDS Nangarhar for almost two weeks and was still unable 
to contact his family when monitors interviewed him. “Please send me to the regular jail.  
At least…at least at the regular jail I could be visited by my family, and it’s an open 
place.”180 
 
A number of detainees were unable to notify family members of their detention, and 
therefore had to rely on released prisoners to pass on word to their relatives. “They didn’t 
let my family meet me, or send me food, or anything. My family did not know about my 
situation at all or where I was. I was there for 37 days when another prisoner who was 
released was able to tell my family where I was.” The detainee alleged he was beaten 
regularly by NDS officials during his first week of detention in NDS Kandahar. “My 
family found out about me when I got into Sarposa [Kandahar Central Jail] and then they 
were able to meet me.”181 
 
International forces also hold individuals for substantial periods of time without 
permitting family contact or notifying family members of detainees’ whereabouts, a 
situation which may be prolonged by transferring them to the NDS. One detainee told 
interviewers that he was held in U.S. custody at “Bagram” for approximately six months 
without contact with his family. According to the detainee, he was then transferred to 
NDS Kabul, where he faced an additional three months without family contact, as well as 
torture before being released. “My family had no news, no information at all, they didn’t 
know where I was, if I was at Bagram, NDS, or Kabul, or wherever.” When he was 
finally released after nine months in captivity, he reported that he was dropped off on a 
road in Kabul and given 1,000 Afghanis [approximately $20] to find his way home. “I 
called my brother and I told him to come and find me…He started crying. My whole 
family was so happy to hear from me. My wife, children, all of them were crying from 
their happiness.”182 U.S. forces at DFIP, however, do permit individuals to contact family 
members through the ICRC, including through a video conference link.   
 
The burden of locating detainees often falls on family members, who may undertake 
frantic searches to locate loved ones after their arrest. “My father started searching for me 
as soon as I was arrested,” explained one detainee. “He went to the provincial police, then 
to Laghman, Jalalabad, Kabul, then to the AIHRC office, then to Bagram. At Bagram 
they gave him a list of prisoners they had handed over to the NDS. After one and a half 
months my father found me and came to visit me at the NDS.” During his detention at 
NDS Kabul, the detainee alleged that he was subjected to severe beatings and threatened 
with electric shock. “My father paid the prosecutor about 80,000 Afghanis[approximately 
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$1600]. We sold two cows and borrowed money to pay the prosecutor. My father also 
spent a lot of money on travel, going back and forth everywhere trying to find me.”183 
 
Interviews with defense lawyers confirm that conflict-related detainees are particularly 
likely to be held in incommunicado detention. As the head of an Afghan legal aid 
organization explained, “No there is no notification, but families should be notified when 
individuals are initially detained. Once they feel like it is time, the NDS will allow family 
members to come and visit. But if families are not influential, and have no connections, 
then they can’t find out about detainees. They can’t even find out if they are in custody 
and they don’t know about their fate.”184 
 
Denial of the Right to Defense Counsel 
The right to counsel is guaranteed in Article 31 of the Afghan Constitution, as well as in 
the ICPC. It is a fundamental procedural protection that mitigates the risk of abuse and 
other violations of detainees’ rights.  The vast majority of detainees interviewed were 
unable to contact or see a lawyer while in NDS custody.  
 
Authorities do not typically inform detainees of their right to counsel, and detainees are 
often unaware that they have this right.
185
  As one detainee in NDS Kandahar stated, “I 
was never told anything about a defense lawyer, and no lawyer was ever offered to me.  
But this is because I am still under investigation and it is too soon for me to have a 
lawyer.”186 
 
It is often family members who must contact defense lawyers on behalf of detainees. 
However, even when families succeed in hiring defense counsel, lawyers are often unable 
to meet with detainees. Family members of a detainee in Kandahar were told by a defense 
lawyer that he would not be able to provide representation while the detainee remained in 
NDS custody. “He said we would have to wait until they were transferred to the central 
jail.”187 The detainee was tortured in ANP custody and then transferred to the NDS, 
where he subsequently died from his injuries.   
 
Partly because it is families, not detainees, who are usually able to contact defense 
lawyers, it can take a substantial amount of time for lawyers to locate and meet with their 
clients. “We find clients through their families, but when we go to the NDS they say, ‘we 
have no one by that name.’ We have to go back and forth searching for them, sometimes 
it can take up to a month before we can eventually get the information,” explained the 
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While lack of access to counsel is a problem in the Afghan justice system as a whole, 
interviews with defense lawyers indicate that the problem is particularly significant for 
conflict-related detainees and that NDS officials deliberately and systematically deny 
access to counsel. According to defense lawyers and legal aid organizations, it usually 
not until after the NDS has completed its investigation or detainees have been transferred 
to MOI detention facilities that defense lawyers are able to access detainees. 
 
As a result of this access to detainees in NDS custody is generally denied while officials 
are conducting investigations and interrogations—the precise period in which detainees 
are at the greatest risk of abuse. “Lawyers face great difficulties interviewing clients,” 
according to the head of one Afghan legal aid organization. “The NDS doesn’t allow 
lawyers to come talk to clients freely. Not until the NDS finishes its investigation do they 
allow the lawyer to be involved. We can see clients, but not before the investigation is 
complete.”189 The statement of one NDS director seemed to confirm that the NDS denies 
access to counsel as a matter of policy: “When the detainee’s investigation is complete 
and when the report is with the prosecutor, then the suspect can have a defense lawyer. 
Otherwise, it would not be clear for the defense lawyer whether the suspect is guilty or 
innocent.”190 
 
Almost every defense lawyer interviewed claimed the NDS denied access to clients 
during investigations. “There is no chance for the detainee to see the defense lawyer in 
the initial investigations; in this primary stage they do not let them call a defense lawyer,” 
said a lawyer from Jalalabad.  A lawyer in Kandahar stated, “No defense lawyer in 
Kandahar has ever met with a detainee in NDS. NDS officials say things like ‘you are 
against the NDS, and therefore you are against our constitution and the law of 
Afghanistan. You are like the friends of the detainees.’”191 
 
The findings of this report contradict official NDS statements that were issued in 
response to the 2011 UNAMA report on detainees.
192
 In its response to the UN report, the 
NDS asserted that, “NDS has not limited the appointment of defense attorneys. The main 
challenge is the insufficient number of defense attorneys which makes it difficult to cover 
all cases. Defense attorneys do not show interest in cases of crimes against internal and 
external security…and do not provide services in insecure provinces.”193 
 
The shortage of defense lawyers in Afghanistan is a very serious challenge, but this does 
not explain situations in which detainees’ lack of access to counsel results directly from 
deliberate acts by NDS officials. Interviews for this report with defense attorneys confirm 
that many work in provinces suffering from significant levels of insecurity—including 
Kandahar, Kunar, Laghman, and Nangarhar— undermining NDS’s claim that detainees 
lack counsel because defense lawyers will not work in insecure areas.  
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Defense lawyers also expressed willingness to take on cases of conflict-related detainees, 
and many have done so. But it is often the NDS’s own practices and policies that deter 
lawyers from representing conflict-related detainees. As discussed below, practices such 
as excluding defense lawyers from investigations, preventing lawyers from meeting with 
their clients, and intimidating defense lawyers, all work to dissuade attorneys from taking 
national security cases and greatly undermine detainees’ right to counsel. 
 
Investigations Conducted by NDS Interrogators Instead of Prosecutors
194
 
In the Afghan justice system, prosecutors are primarily responsible for conducting 
investigations.
195
 Interviews with conflict-related detainees and defense lawyers confirm 
that in political or national security cases, NDS investigators, rather than prosecutors, 
often assume responsibility for conducting investigations and interrogations.
196
 The 
assumption of investigative authority by NDS officials, and the delegation of this 
authority by prosecutors, is a key reason for systematic due process violations and 




As a defense lawyer in Kandahar explained, “Our biggest problem is that the police or the 
NDS don’t have rights to do investigations of detainees; this is only the right of the 
prosecutor or judges, but unfortunately they do it illegally and send their findings to the 
court. They keep a detainee for a long time without any reason; they only have the right 
to keep him for 15 days and not more but they keep them for months.”198 
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Numerous defense lawyers interviewed claimed that it is during this initial investigatory 
period that detainees are subjected to mistreatment and torture, claims consistent with 




In effect, the NDS has become a “one-stop shop” in which arrest, detention, 
investigation, and interrogation all take place under the authority of NDS officials, 
without prosecutorial oversight or judicial review.
200
 Only upon completion of its 
investigation does the NDS typically forward the case to prosecutors for formal 
indictment, which is often based solely on the findings of NDS investigators. The vesting 
of both investigative as well as detention authority exclusively with the NDS, particularly 
without any independent judicial review or oversight, greatly increases the vulnerability 
of detainees to mistreatment and torture.  
 
Denial of Defense Lawyers’ Right to be Present and Participate in Investigations 
The most significant challenges identified by legal aid organizations and defense lawyers 
in representing conflict-related detainees were the exclusion of defense lawyers from 
investigations and their inability to review findings and case files prior to trial. By 
excluding defense lawyers from participating in investigations, NDS officials not only 
undermine detainees’ rights to counsel and to a fair trial, but they also remove a key 
procedural protection that helps ensure that confessions are not coerced and that detainees 
are free from torture. 
 
In the Afghan justice system, the presence and participation of defense lawyers in the 
investigation of suspects play important roles in the judicial process. Under the ICPC, 
defense counsel has the right to be present during any interrogations of suspects, 
searches, examination of experts and witnesses, and line-ups. The defense lawyer also 
has the right to access the findings of the investigation and the case file compiled by the 
prosecutor prior to trial.
201
 Defense lawyers’ presence and engagement with prosecutors 
during investigations enable them to ensure that detainees’ rights are respected, to learn 
of the evidence against their clients, and to assist their clients in preparing a defense. 
Detainees also have a basic right to understand the grounds for their arrest, and a 
meaningful opportunity to challenge their detention, which requires both access to legal 
counsel and the evidence against them.  
 
As discussed above, investigations in political or national security cases are conducted 
not by prosecutors—generally the proper investigating authorities under Afghan law—
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but by NDS officials.
202
 Almost every defense lawyer interviewed pointed to the inability 
to participate in investigations as the central challenge in representing conflict-related 
detainees, particularly the NDS denial of access to clients during investigation phase and 
interrogations, and NDS refusal to share findings of investigations or information 
compiled in case files.
203
  “In normal cases the police and prosecutors will cooperate—
but with the  NDS we may be able to visit the client, but only to visit—not to participate 
in the investigation,” one defense lawyer stated.204 
 
As another lawyer explained, “If it’s a regular police case, a murder case for example, the 
other prosecutors allow us to take part in investigation. Sometimes they will even call us 
and say we’re looking at this case today and he’s your client. But with NDS, all we are 
allowed to do is to have the initial agreement with the client. They just do that so they can 
hold it before the court and say they allowed access. But then after that we never see our 
client again. They don’t even let us study the file. We only get to study the case once we 
arrive in court to defend them. The law says that the lawyers have the right to take part in 
investigation, but they don’t allow us.”205 
 
Intimidation of Defense Lawyers 
A number of defense lawyers reported that they or their colleagues have faced 
intimidation and pressure by NDS officials because of their decisions to represent 
conflict-related detainees. Such intimidation undermines detainees’ right to counsel and 
may inhibit the ability and willingness of defense lawyers to document and report abuse 
of their clients. 
 
As the head of one Afghan legal aid organization explained, “The power is in the hands 
of the NDS and sometimes they use it to threaten lawyers. This is a big challenge. 
Lawyers fear they will be arrested. Some are arrested simply for calling certain phone 
numbers or being in the call history of someone arrested. The NDS will claim that they 
are helping terrorists get in touch with each other and implement their plans.”206 
 
One defense lawyer in Kabul described how he was detained by the NDS for merely 
speaking with individuals seeking legal assistance for detainees in NDS custody: “Last 
year I was detained by NDS for two nights. I was working with [a legal aid organization] 
at the time. Two people came to me and asked me to take cases in Zabul and Helmand 
provinces for NDS detainees. The next day I was leaving my home and NDS was waiting 
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for me, they arrested me and took me away.”207 NDS officials interrogated the lawyer, 
asking him why he would consider representing detainees and pressuring him not to take 
on such cases. “Eventually a government Minister intervened and I was released, thank 
God! But they were planning on taking me to some place to torture me. They told me to 
sign a paper saying I will never defend any insurgents or Taliban.”208 
 
Such pressure also deters lawyers from taking cases of conflict-related detainees. 
“Another problem we have with the NDS is that they are threatening the defense lawyer 
during the trial. For example, if our client is beaten by them, then indirectly they will 
attack our lawyers. ‘Why would an ILF lawyer complain of an NDS person? How dare 
you?’  It happens often when the lawyers of [our legal aid organization] work on NDS 
cases. That’s why our lawyers sometimes do not take these cases. In Afghanistan, this is a 
dangerous job.”209 
 
VIII. Accountability and Transparency 
 
Afghan Government Efforts to Prevent Torture and Mistreatment of Detainees 
In recent years, the Afghan government has taken a number of positive steps to address 
weaknesses in the justice sector, which has consistently lagged behind the security sector 
in terms of efforts and resources dedicated to reform.
210
 The Afghan government has also 
introduced measures which it hopes will help prevent torture and abuse in detention 
facilities, including improved training for prison officials, and a multiyear program that 





Several measures have been taken to improve detainee treatment at the NDS in particular. 
In December 2010 (Qaws 1390), the NDS created an oversight commission charged with 
monitoring detention facilities and responding to allegations of mistreatment.
212
 In 
response to the UNAMA detentions report, the Afghan government has also created a 
government committee to assess the allegations, and a Human Rights Unit in the NDS 
Office of Legal Affairs, which has access to detainees and is responsible for protecting 
detainee rights.  
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The Afghan government also renewed its commitment to protecting conflict-related 
detainees from torture and mistreatment.
213
 It expressed its determination “to abide by the 
provisions of the enforced laws of the country, particularly Article 29, Chapter Two of 
the Constitution which deals with the prohibition of torture.”214 The NDS has committed 
to convene a seminar for interrogative and reconnaissance departments, and implemented 
trainings on interrogation for 80 officials with the support of the UK government.
215
 The 
NDS acknowledged that “reform is feasible” and has committed to ensuring 
accountability for torture by investigating allegations of abuse, suspending officials 




In a January 2012 (Jadi 1390) meeting with a commissioner of the AIHRC, Dr.Sima 
Samar, and the head of the NDS, Rahmatullah Nabil, President Hamid Karzai made a 
commitment that AIHRC monitors would be given unlimited access to NDS facilities. 
 
While the Afghan government’s stated commitment to reform is welcome, and it has 
taken positive steps to end torture, the government has failed to take some of the most 
basic steps toward addressing detainee abuse, including holding individuals responsible 
for torture accountable and ensuring transparency by making findings of investigations 
public, publishing all laws relevant to the legal authority of the NDS, and ensuring 
independent monitors have access to all NDS detention facilities. 
 
Failure to Hold NDS Officials Accountable for Torture 
The first steps in ensuring accountability for torture are the suspension, investigation, and 
if justified, removal of officials responsible for torture. The Afghan government has 
largely failed to hold NDS officials implicated in detainee abuse accountable. Though 
several NDS officials have been removed from their positions, most have simply been 
transferred to different detention facilities where they retain responsibility for detainee 
treatment.  
 
The Afghan Government has removed several officials implicated in torture.
217
 However, 
in many of these cases, officials were not removed from the NDS but instead shifted or 
reassigned from one facility to another. The head of NDS Khost, where UNAMA found 
systematic torture, was installed as the head of NDS Gardez. The head of NDS Gardez 
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was, in turn, made head of NDS Khost. Similarly, the head of NDS Laghman, a facility 
where AIHRC, Open Society, and UNAMA have all found significant evidence of 
torture, was made deputy head of NDS Nangarhar, with the head of NDS Nangarhar 
taking over NDS Laghman.  In these cases, individuals implicated in serious allegations 
of torture were not even demoted or subject to other disciplinary action. Instead, they 
were simply reassigned to new positions of leadership within the NDS. 
 
According to NDS officials, investigations of individuals are ongoing and after 
investigations are complete, the NDS will decide whether to discipline or remove 
officials.
218
 However, despite requests by the researchers, NDS officials have not 
provided any additional information regarding which, if any individuals are currently 
under investigation, or have been removed, transferred, or disciplined as a result of 




Actions Taken against Government Officials Implicated in Detainee Abuse
220
 
Head of NDS Kandahar, General 
Muhammad Naeem 
Removed September 2011 (Sunbola 
1390), remains within the NDS 
Deputy Head of NDS Kandahar, Col Abdul 
Wahab 
Removed September 2011 (Sunbola 
1390), remains within the NDS 
Head of NDS Khost, Akhtar Mohammad 
Ibrahimi 
Reassigned, currently Head of NDS 
Gardez 
Head of NDS Laghman, Noor Khayder Reassigned, currently Deputy Head of 
NDS Nangarhar 
Head of NDS Nangarhar Reassigned, currently Head of NDS 
Laghman 
Head of NDS Farah Suspended 
Director of JCC Helmand, 
AbdullahKhurram 
Reassigned as director of JCC Uruzgan; 
has since left that position 
 
 
In response to criticisms regarding the failure to hold individuals accountable, NDS 
officials have contended that they cannot “ruin a person’s career” based on mere 
allegations, and investigations are necessary to determine whether removal or other 
disciplinary action is justified.
221
 Investigations are certainly necessary and proper when 
allegations of abuse are made. But investigations must be genuine, findings made public, 
and action taken against those responsible. So far, there is little indication that the NDS 
has taken such steps. No findings of any NDS investigations have been made public, and 
despite credible evidence of torture provided to the NDS by UNAMA, including findings 
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of torture in 16 detention facilities, no officials appear to have been permanently 
dismissed from the NDS, nor have any officials been prosecuted for abusing detainees.  
 
Transferring individuals into new positions is not meaningful accountability, which 
requires subjecting individuals to appropriate disciplinary measures, including permanent 
removal from positions if they are responsible for detainee abuse. Failing to hold 
individuals accountable for torture not only robs victims of justice, but permits 
perpetrators to continue abusing detainees, and sends a signal to other officials that 
torture will go unpunished. 
 
Denial of Access to NDS Facilities 
Denial of access to the detention facilities is another challenge faced by AIHRC 
monitors. Such denials are not always direct or explicit, and AIHRC staff have 
encountered several forms of restrictions and constraints on access that compromise the 
effectiveness of monitoring. These restrictions on access are inconsistent with the NDS’s 
previous statements that “all the detention centres and investigation sub-directorates of 
the NDS are open to inspections [by AIHRC and a group of other institutions] and they 
have full access to [the facilities].”222 
 
Over the research period for this report, AIHRC monitors were explicitly denied access to 
two NDS facilities: NDS Kunar and NDS Department 90/124. In February 2011 (Dalwa 
1390), the director of NDS Kunar denied AIHRC access to the facility stating that NDS 
Kabul had not granted them permission to grant access to AIHRC monitors. The AIHRC 
has also repeatedly requested access to NDS Department 90/124, most recently on 




Significantly, the NDS does not generally permit the AIHRC to conduct unannounced 
visits to any NDS facilities, which seriously undermines the ability of AIHRC to fulfill its 
legal mandate and conduct effective monitoring. Before visiting detention facilities, NDS 
officials usually require the AIHRC to submit a formal letter requesting access at least 1-
2 days in advance. NDS officials also prohibit AIHRC monitors from bringing cameras 
into NDS facilities, which prevents AIHRC monitors from properly documenting 




AIHRC monitors have encountered a range of additional difficulties in gaining full, 
unfettered access to NDS facilities. On numerous occasions, NDS officials have abruptly 
cancelled AIHRC visits—sometimes even while the monitors are on the way to the 
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facility—and insisted that the visit must be postponed because another monitoring group 
is visiting the facility. AIHRC monitors have been prevented from visiting facilities 
under such circumstances multiple times, even when visits were arranged and approved 
well in advance. Other times, detention officials would simply deny that any visit had 
been arranged, even if monitors had the proper documentation and approval. The AIHRC 
also observed during several facility visits that certain protocols and practices of NDS 
officials, such as official meetings and excessive and prolonged facility tours, resulted in 
significant delays and time constraints that affected the quantity and quality of detainee 
interviews AIHRC monitors were able to conduct. 
 
In general, the persistent uncertainty AIHRC monitors face in gaining full, unfettered 
access to NDS facilities, and the apparent discretion of local NDS officials in granting 
access, undermines AIHRC’s ability to fulfill its mandate to conduct rigorous and 





National Directorate of Security  
● Investigate all credible allegations of torture, including reports of torture at the NDS 
facilities identified in this report. 
● Investigate and hold to account all those who are responsible for torture, including 
commanding officers. End the practice of moving rather than removing officials 
responsible for torture and make public or provide to AIHRC the results of 
investigations and actions taken. 
● Ensure AIHRC has full, unfettered, and confidential access to all NDS detainees and 
facilities, including NDS Kabul Department 90/124, as legally mandated under the 
Constitution of Afghanistan. Ensure NDS officials permit AIHRC monitors to 
conduct unannounced visits to all NDS facilities. 
● Ensure the NDS Human Rights Unit immediately inspects and investigates NDS 
detention facilities where the AIHRC alerts the government that it has been denied 
access. 
● Investigate all credible allegations of “off-site” or undisclosed facilities being used by 
NDS interrogators, and end the use of such facilities or locations for interrogations, to 
which independent monitors have no access.  
● Provide the NDS Human Rights Unit with the authority and resources necessary to 
effectively investigate allegations of abuse and ensure those responsible are held to 
account. 
● Cease holding detainees incommunicado. Notify family members of detainee’s arrest 
immediately or as soon as practicably possible, ensure access to legal counsel, and 
permit family members to visit detainees. Transfer all detainees to MOI custody 
within 72 hours, inform detainees of the reason for their arrest within 24 hours, and 
ensure all detentions beyond 72 hours are authorized by a prosecutor or judge. 
● Ensure investigations are conducted by the proper authorities under Afghan law; 
permit prosecutors to conduct investigations of suspects. 
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● Ensure defense lawyers have access to detainees and all NDS detention facilities at all 
stages of detention as well as proper access to the findings of investigations and 
evidence against clients. 
● Provide mandatory training for NDS interrogators and their superiors on lawful 
interrogation methods, alternative investigative approaches (such as forensics), and 
legal obligations under Afghan and international law that prohibit torture and ill‐
treatment, in coordination with international partners. 
 
Government of Afghanistan  
● Make public all legislation and Presidential decrees governing the legal authority of 
NDS. 
 
Afghan Supreme Court 
● Ensure judges do not permit confessions obtained through torture to be admitted in 
court, as required by the Afghan Constitution and the Interim Criminal Procedure 
Code. 
● Issue guidance to all judges to require them to investigate allegations made by 
detainees of confessions under duress.   
● Ensure that AIHRC monitors can testify in court and make available other evidence 
relevant to a detainee’s allegation of torture, ill-treatment, and other forms of abuse.  
 
Afghan Parliament 
● Reform the ICPC to provide detainees the right to have their detention promptly and 
periodically reviewed by a court and the right to challenge the lawfulness of their 
detention before a court, consistent with Afghanistan’s obligations under the ICCPR. 
● Create a mechanism to ensure proper compensation for victims of abuse and torture 
suffered as a result of acts by state officials. 
 
ISAF Command and Troop Contributing Nations  
● Support the NDS and the Afghan government to ensure all detainees are free from 
torture. Work with the NDS to identify critical deficiencies in resources, and provide 
appropriate technical and financial assistance to help ensure detainee treatment and 
interrogations comply with Afghan and international law. 
● Enhance the capacity of Afghan officials to conduct lawful and effective 
interrogations, evidence-based investigations and prosecutions, and strengthen the 
effectiveness of internal monitoring and accountability mechanisms. 
● Make use of ISAF suspension and remediation policies to work with the Afghan 
government to adopt measures that will protect all detainees from abuse, such as full, 
unfettered access by AIHRC, detainee access to defense counsel, and accountability 
for detainee abuse.  
● Ensure no detainee is transferred into facilities where there is real risk of torture. 
Where detainee transfers have been suspended by ISAF due to credible allegations 
of torture, ensure resumption of transfers to a facility occur only when there is 
sufficient information to determine that there is no real risk of torture at that facility. 
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● Ensure the detainee monitoring program has the resources, civilian expertise, and 




● Constructively engage with the NDS to ensure it provides guarantees of lawful 
detainee treatment, and holds officials accountable for abuse.  
● Support the NDS and the Afghan government to ensure all detainees are free from 
torture. Work with the NDS to identify critical deficiencies in resources, and provide 
appropriate technical and financial assistance to help ensure detainee treatment and 
interrogations comply with Afghan and international law. 
● Enhance the capacity of Afghan officials to conduct lawful and effective 
interrogations, evidence-based investigations and prosecutions, and strengthen the 
effectiveness of internal monitoring and accountability mechanisms. 
● Ensure all U.S. forces, including U.S. Special Operations Forces and intelligence 
agency personnel, comply with U.S. detainee transfer policies and international law 
and are covered by the AIHRC monitoring program. 
 
